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MACROECONOMIC  GROWTH has long been viewed as one of the most ef- 
fective ways to reduce  poverty. Historically,  the rising  tide  of labor  mar- 
ket opportunities  that accompanies  an economic expansion  has helped 
the poor more  than  the rich, leading  to a narrowing  of the income distri- 
bution and a fall in poverty.' Using data from the 1950s through  the 
1970s,  for example,  Rebecca  M. Blank  and  Alan  S. Blinder  estimate  that 
a one percentage  point reduction  in unemployment  lowers the poverty 
rate by one point.2  Economic growth in the 1980s, however, seems to 
have had far weaker redistributive  effects.3 The economic expansion 
from 1983  to 1989  led to a more  than  four  percentage  point  decline  in un- 
employment,  but only a modest decline in aggregate  poverty. Further- 
more, family income inequality  increased  steadily throughout  the dec- 
ade. As shown  in figure  1, the income  shares  of the three  lowest quintiles 
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1. See Blank  and  Blinder  (1986)  and  Beach  (1977). 
2. Blank  and  Blinder  (1986). 
3. For  a discussion  of the changing  relationship  between  the macroeconomy  and  pov- 
erty  and  income  distribution,  see Blank  (1993),  Cutler  and Katz (1991),  and  Tobin  (forth- 
coming). 
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Figure 1.  Quintile Shares of Total Income, 1967-91 
Percent 
50 
Quintile  5 
40 
30 
Quintile  4 
------__-_--------___---_----____________________-- 
20  -  Quintile  3 
.................................  ................................................................................................... 
Quintile  2 
10 
_  Quintile  1 
1967  1969  1971  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on March CPS data. 
of the income distribution  fell during  the 1980s, while the share of the 
top quintile  rose.4 
Several  explanations  have been offered  for the rising  income  inequal- 
ity and  stubbornly  high  poverty  rates  of the past  decade. One  hypothesis 
is that changes in household composition  or shifts in the labor market 
attachment  of low-income workers have clouded the relationship  be- 
tween aggregate  growth,  poverty, and  the income  distribution.  While  re- 
jecting this explanation,  Blank's 1993  work, as well as a 1991  study by 
David  M. Cutler  and  Lawrence  F. Katz, emphasizes  the effect of widen- 
ing  wage inequality.5  For reasons  that  are only partially  understood,  the 
4. Mean  income  in the bottom  quintile  fell from  a high  of $6,425  (1991  dollars)  in 1977 
to a low of $5,940  in 1991.  Mean  income  in the top quintile  rose by $9,000  during  this same 
time  period.  The  data  underlying  these calculations  are  described  in more  detail  in the next 
section. 
5. Blank  (1993)  and  Cutler  and  Katz  (1991)  also investigate  whether  the actual  decline 
in poverty  over the 1980s  was understated  by measurement  errors  in the official  poverty 
measure.  This  does not appear  to have  happened. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  287 
Table 1.  Components of GDP Growth, 1959-89 
Percent  per year 
Decomposition 
Decomposition  by hoursa 
by employment  Real  GDP  Hours  of 
Real  GDP  Real  GDP  Employment  per hour  work per 
Period  per capita  per employee  per capita  of  work  capita 
1959-69  2.7  2.1  0.6  2.5  0.2 
1969-79  1.8  0.4  1.3  1.0  0.8 
1979-89  1.5  0.7  0.8  1.0  0.5 
1983-89  2.7  1.1  1.6  1.2  1.5 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on Ecotionoic Report of the Presiden7t  (1993, tables B I  B29,  B31,  and B42); 
Emnploymenit  and Earniings (April 1970, table C-1, p. 89, and April 1990, table C-I.  p.  11  3); and National Income and 
Product Accounts  (NIPA).  All monetary data are calculated  in 1991 dollars. 
a.  Aggregate hours are calculated by multiplying the number of employees  by average hours of work per week  by 
48, where 48 represents the typical  weeks  at work per year among full-time workers. 
wages of less skilled workers  grew more slowly during  the 1980s  than 
average  wages in the economy.6  The rise in wage  dispersion  has presum- 
ably contributed  to the widening  of the income distribution. 
Other  analysts have pointed to the slow rate of productivity  growth 
during  the 1980s.7 Table 1 presents some comparative  data on income 
and productivity  growth  for the past three decades. Judged  in terms of 
output  growth,  the economic expansion  of the 1980s  was not too differ- 
ent from  the expansion  of the 1960s:  real  GDP  per  capita  rose by 2.7 per- 
cent per year from 1983 to 1989, identical to the 2.7 percent growth rate 
from 1959 to 1969. The primary source of GDP growth in the 1960s was 
growth  in output  per worker:  productivity  grew at 2.1 percent  per year 
over the decade. In the 1980s,  by comparison,  output  per worker  grew 
at a much slower pace, 1.1 percent  per year. Most of the expansion in 
aggregate  output  in the 1980s  was due to employment  growth. As also 
shown in table 1, the conclusion  is similar  in the case of growth  rates in 
GDP  per  hour,  rather  than  per  employee:  productivity  per  worker  or per 
hour  grew slowly during  the 1980s.  Thus, if productivity  gains are the 
conduit between macroeconomic  growth and income distribution,  it 
may not be too surprising  that the economic expansion of the 1980s 
failed  to substantially  lower poverty or narrow  income  inequality. 
Despite the plausibility  of a link between wage inequality  and family 
income inequality,  or between productivity  growth  and the earnings  of 
6. For  documentation  of this  trend  and  a discussion  of its underlying  determinants,  see 
Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Pierce  (1993),  Karoly  (1993),  and  Levy and  Murnane  (1992). 
7. See Tobin  (forthcoming)  and Slottje  (1989). 288  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
low-wage workers, the available evidence on the determinants  of the 
U.S. income  distribution  is limited.  Existing  studies  rely on a handful  of 
annual  observations  to compare  the responsiveness of aggregate  pov- 
erty rates  or income shares  to economic growth  or unemployment  rates 
over time. Because of data limitations,  many of the statistical  relations 
are  imprecisely  estimated,  and  only a few covariates  can be investigated 
simultaneously. Few  previous studies have  distinguished between 
growth  in aggregate  output  and  growth  in productivity.  No study  tries  to 
directly  estimate  the effect of rising  wage inequality  on poverty rates or 
income shares.8 
In this paper,  we seek to expand  the available  evidence on the deter- 
minants  of the income  distribution  and  the poverty  rate.  We link  regional 
information  on earnings,  incomes, and  poverty rates  for nine regions  of 
the United States to region-specific  data on regional unemployment 
rates, as well as the level and dispersion  of hourly wages. As we shall 
show, striking  differences in the patterns  of economic growth, unem- 
ployment,  and wage inequality  occur across regions. These differences 
provide a rich proving ground for evaluating alternative hypotheses 
about the link between poverty, income distribution,  and economic 
change. 
The next section of this paper  describes the longitudinal  data set of 
regional income and poverty statistics that we have assembled from 
U.S.  Bureau of the Census Current  Population  Survey (CPS) micro- 
data files available as tape data sets. The third section investigates 
the connection between aggregate  indicators  of economic well-being 
(unemployment  rates and median  income growth)  and the distribution 
of income, and analyzes the stability of this relationship  over time. 
In the fourth section, we examine how income distribution  responds 
to changes in the labor market, investigating  the combined effects 
of unemployment rates, median wage rates, and the dispersion of 
hourly wages. The fifth section briefly describes the role of family 
composition  in widening  income inequality.  The sixth section focuses 
explicitly on poverty rates and their relationship  to economic change. 
In the last section, we summarize  our findings and draw some con- 
clusions. 
8. Blank  (1993)  and  Cutler  and  Katz  (1991)  treat  the effect of rising  wage  inequality  as 
a residual,  rather  than  attempting  to measure  it directly. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  289 
Data Description 
We used information  from the March  Current  Population  Survey to 
construct  family income statistics and poverty rates by region and by 
year. The March  CPS collects retrospective  information  on weeks of 
employment  and  unemployment,  total  earnings,  and  income  for the pre- 
vious calendar  year. Consistent  surveys  are  available  from 1968  through 
1992,  providing  information  for 1967  through  1991,  a total  of twenty-five 
years. For  each year, we computed  averages  of labor  market  and  income 
variables  by region  for the nine U. S. census divisions  by income  quintile 
within region, and by family type within each income quintile. This 
breakdown  yields a total of 9,000 observations:  ten regional  observa- 
tions (nine regions, plus the total United States) for six income cate- 
gories (five income quintiles,  plus the total region)  and six family  types 
(five family types, plus all families)  for twenty-five  years. Our  data set 
includes  employment  rates  for family  heads and other  family  members, 
weeks of employment  or unemployment,  total earnings  of family  heads 
and  other  family  members,  total  family  income, and  demographic  infor- 
mation  on the individuals  within  each region-quintile-family  type cell.9 
The micro-level  household  unit that  forms the basis of our statistical 
analysis  is what we will call a "family  unit."  Conceptually,  a family  unit 
is a set of related  individuals  who live in the same household. Persons 
who live alone or with  other  unrelated  individuals  are  treated  as a family 
unit  with  one family  member.  In contrast,  the U.S. Census  Bureau  treats 
unrelated  individuals  (persons  who live without  other  family  members) 
as fundamentally  different  from  other  families  and  provides  no data  that 
combine  both types of family  units. This feature  of official  poverty and 
income distribution  statistics  is potentially  troubling  because of the ris- 
ing fraction  of single-person  family units in the population  and the im- 
plied selectivity biases that arise in analyzing  either type of family unit 
in isolation. 
9. During  the 1968-92  period,  the March  CPS supplement  was revised  several  times, 
resulting  in changes  in the estimated  coverage  of reported  income  in the  CPS  (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1991,  appendix  C, and U.S. Bureau  of the Census, 1992a,  appendix  C). In 
addition,  nonresponse  rates  and  imputation  procedures  have  changed,  as have top-coding 
limits  on income  components.  We have  not attempted  to incorporate  any  of these changes 
in our  data, relying  instead  on the use of year  effects in our statistical  models to capture 
these  and  other  measurement-related  changes. 290  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Within the population of family units, we distinguish five family 
types: families headed by an elderly person; families with children 
(under  age 19)  headed  by a nonelderly  single person;'0  families  without 
children  headed  by a nonelderly  single person;"I  families  with children 
headed by a nonelderly  married  person; and families without children 
headed  by a nonelderly  married  person. 
The fractions  of these different  family  types are illustrated  in the top 
panel  of table  2. The fraction  of family  units  headed  by an elderly  person 
has been relatively constant over the past twenty-five  years, whereas 
the fraction  of family  units  headed  by single  persons  has grown, and the 
fraction  headed  by married  persons has fallen. The rise in proportion  of 
family units headed by single people without children  is striking:  by 
1991,  this was the largest  single  family  type. Married  couples with chil- 
dren,  which  accounted  for 39.6 percent  of all family  units  in 1967,  repre- 
sented  less than  one-quarter  of family  units  in 1991. 
We define  a family unit as poor if its total family income falls below 
the official poverty threshold based on its size and composition. Be- 
cause we are  combining  census family  groupings  and  unrelated  individu- 
als, our  poverty  rate  for family  units  lies between  the official  rate  for un- 
related  individuals  and  the official  rate  for families. Figure  2 graphs  our 
estimated poverty rate, labeled "all family units," against the official 
rates. Apart from a trend factor (which is mainly attributable  to the 
strong  downward  trend  in poverty rates for unrelated  individuals),  our 
composite poverty rate for family units tracks the official  poverty rate 
for census families very well. Indeed, a regression  of our poverty rate 
against  the official  family  poverty  rate  (including  an intercept  and  a time 
trend)  produces  a coefficient  of 1.04  and  an R-squared  of 0.93. 
The changing  family  unit composition  of the poor population  is illus- 
trated  in the second type of family  unit  shown  in table  2. In 1967,  40 per- 
cent of poor family  units were headed  by an elderly person and 18  per- 
cent were headed  by married  couples with children.  Twenty-five  years 
later, the fraction  of family  units headed  by an elderly  person  had  fallen 
dramatically  (driven  by a large  drop  in the poverty rate  for the elderly), 
10. According  to calculations  using  March  CPS  data,  85 percent  of these families  were 
headed  by single  females  in 1991. 
11. In 1991,  88 percent  of these family  units  were composed  of unrelated  individuals, 
although  unmarried  but related  individuals  sharing  the same housing  unit also appear  in 
this category. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  291 
Table 2.  Family Unit Composition of Overall Population, Poor Population, 
and Family Income Quintiles, 1967-91 
Percent of total within subsample 
Single heads  Married  heads 
Elderly  With  Without  With  Without 
Subsample  Year  head  children  children  children  children 
All family units  1967  19.3  5.3  15.6  39.6  20.2 
1979  19.6  7.9  24.1  29.4  19.0 
1991  20.4  9.3  28.9  24.0  17.4 
Poor family unitsa  1967  40.1  13.4  23.1  17.5  5.8 
1979  27.5  22.5  32.1  13.4  4.5 
1991  20.8  26.9  35.2  13.1  4.1 
First quintile  1967  49.0  9.0  27.8  7.0  7.2 
family units  1979  39.7  14.4  36.3  5.4  4.3 
1991  31.1  19.1  40.7  5.6  3.4 
Second  quintile  1967  23.6  8.7  23.4  27.8  16.4 
family units  1979  28.6  11.4  34.6  15.7  9.7 
1991  30.8  11.4  37.5  12.8  7.4 
Third quintile  1967  10.1  4.8  14.1  50.2  20.9 
family units  1979  15.2  8.0  28.0  30.6  18.2 
1991  20.1  8.4  34.0  22.7  14.7 
Fourth quintile  1967  6.4  2.4  7.2  58.5  25.5 
family units  1979  8.3  4.1  15.1  45.6  26.9 
1991  11.9  5.9  22.7  35.9  23.7 
Fifth quintile  1967  6.1  1.4  4.8  56.2  31.5 
family units  1979  6.2  1.9  6.6  49.4  35.9 
1991  8.7  1.9  10.2  42.0  37.1 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on March CPS files, released  by the  U.S.  Bureau of the Census  as tape data 
sets.  Each  year's  data set  is  a file containing  household-level  data for 60,000-70,000  households  and person-level 
data for 150,000-200,000  adults (age  16 or older) in these  households.  We used the March 1968 to March 1992 data 
sets,  which report annual data for the previous  year (1967-91). 
a.  Poor family units are those  with total income  below  the official poverty  threshold. 
while the fraction  of family units headed  by a single person in the poor 
population  had  risen (mainly  because of increases  in the overall  fraction 
of single-headed  families, rather  than any relative change in poverty 
rates  for single-headed  families). 
Within  each region,  we compute  the quintiles  of family  income  across 
all family units. We then assign each family unit to a quintile  and com- 
pute mean  income by quintile  and the share  of total income received by 
family units in each quintile. As indicated in figure 1, the resulting 
quintile  shares show a declining  fraction of total income for quintiles 
1-3 over the past two decades, coupled with a rise in the share for 292  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
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quintile  5. These patterns  are  very similar  to the trends  in published  data 
on quintile  shares  for census families. 
The family  composition  of the five income quintiles  is summarized  in 
the five lower panels of table 2. Consistent  with their  declining  share  of 
the poor population,  family units headed by elderly persons have be- 
come a smaller fraction of the first quintile, and a larger  fraction of 
quintiles  2 and 3. At the same time, the fraction  of family  units headed 
by a single  person  in quintile  1  has risen  from  37 to 60  percent.  Most  fam- 
ily units  in the fourth  and  fifth  quintiles  are headed  by married  couples. 
Regional  Variation in Income  Growth, Poverty, 
and Income  Distribution 
A primary  goal of this paper  is to use differences  in regional  growth 
rates to estimate  the effects of economic change  on poverty and the in- 
come distribution.  If regional  data  are to provide  more  information  than Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  293 
Table 3.  Unemployment Rates, Per Capita Income, and Median Family Income 
by Region, 1969-89a 
East  West  East  West 
United  New  Mid-  north  nior  th  South  south  south  Moiu,i- 
Measuire  States  England  Atlantic  central  central  Atlantic  central  central  tain  Pacific 
Unemployment  1969  3.5  3.0  3.2  3.2  2.4  3.4  3.7  3.7  4.2  5.1 
rates  1979  5.8  5.4  7.0  6.1  4.0  5.5  6.1  4.7  5.1  6.4 
1989  5.3  3.9  4.7  5.7  4.5  4.8  6.3  6.8  5.5  5.2 
Average real  1969  13,099  14,277  14,732  13,861  12,369  11,780  9,671  10,962  11,709  14,739 
per capita  1979  15,551  16,147  16,345  16,300  15,519  14,212  12,285  14,571  14,658  17,413 
income  1989  19,216  23,183  22,213  18,933  17,922  18,808  15,145  16,145  16,931  20,814 
Growth rates in 
real per  1969-79  1.73  1.24  1.04  1.63  2.29  1.89  2.42  2.89  2.27  1.68 
capita income  1979-89  2.14  3.68  3.12  1.51  1.45  2.84  2.11  1.03  1.45  1.80 
Real median  1969  28,216  31,213  29,979  31,743  26,099  25,108  21,162  23,613  28,209  30,677 
family unit  1979  26,977  27,456  26,979  30,229  26,004  25,367  23,416  23,607  27,340  27,876 
income  1989  27,786  32,398  30,980  29,314  25,550  26,600  21,917  23,551  26,057  29,875 
Growth rates in 
real median 
family unit  1969-79  -0.45  -1.27  -1.05  -0.49  -0.04  0.10  1.02  0.00  -  0.31  -  0.95 
income  1979-89  0.30  1.67  1.39  -0.31  -0.18  0.48  -0.66  -0.02  -0.48  0.69 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on March CPS files. 
a.  Incomes  are in real dollars and are deflated using the GDP deflator, with  1991 =  100. Unemployment  rates are 
in percent.  Average  real  per capita  income  and real  median  family  unit income  are  in  1991 real dollars  and are 
deflated using the GDP deflator. Growth rates are expressed  as percent per year. 
national  data, there  must be different  patterns  of unemployment  and in- 
come growth  across regions, as well as differences  in poverty rates and 
distributional  outcomes that reflect these differences in economic ac- 
tivity. 
Table  3 indicates  that  there  were significant  regional  differences  in in- 
come growth  and unemployment  during  our sample  period. For exam- 
ple, unemployment  rates in the middle  Atlantic states rose faster than 
the national  average between 1969  and 1979, while real per capita in- 
come and  median  family  income  grew more  slowly than  the national  av- 
erage. During  the same period unemployment  rates in the west south 
central  states rose only modestly  and  incomes  climbed  in response  to the 
rise in energy prices. Between 1979  and 1989,  however, these relative 
patterns  were reversed;  unemployment  fell and income grew rapidly  in 
the middle  Atlantic  states, while unemployment  rose and income stag- 
nated  in the west south central  states. 
Figure  3 plots the income shares  of the first  quintile  in the nine  regions 
between 1967-91. Most regions show a secular decline in the first 
quintile  share, although  the timing  and magnitude  of the decline varies, 
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west north  central  and  south  Atlantic  states. Perhaps  surprisingly  (given 
the very different  patterns  of income growth),  the middle  Atlantic  and 
west south central states show similar patterns for the first quintile 
share. 
As shown in figure  4, poverty rates also vary in both level and trend 
across regions.12  The patterns  in the west south central  and middle  At- 
lantic  states are  broadly  consistent  with their  income  trends.  Relative  to 
the middle  Atlantic  region,  poverty  rates  in the west south  central  region 
declined  in the 1970s  and rose in the 1980s.  Poverty rates in New Eng- 
land were relatively stable, declining  modestly from 1982  to 1989  and 
surging  rapidly  upward  between 1989  and  1991.13 
12. For simplicity,  we have  only presented  poverty  rates  in three  regions. 
13. At first  glance,  the trends  in the poverty  rate  and  the first  quintile  income  share  for 
New England  may seem contradictory.  Poverty,  however,  depends  on the absolute  level 
of income  among  the lowest-income  group,  rather  than  their  relative  share  of income. In 
New England,  the decline  in the share  of income  received  by the lowest  quintile  was offset 
by average  income  growth,  leading  to relative  stability  in the poverty  rate. 296  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
These differing  regional  patterns  of unemployment,  income growth, 
income  distribution,  and  poverty  allow us to study  the linkages  between 
economic growth and the well-being of low-income families with far 
more  degrees  of freedom  than  national-level  data  can provide.  14  In addi- 
tion, we can control  for other unmeasured  factors that affect outcomes 
in particular  regions  or particular  years by including  region  and  year ef- 
fects in our  analyses. 
Specifically,  we can analyze  equations  of the form 
(1)  yj=  Xj,d  +  tj + Qt + uj,, 
where  yj, represents  an outcome  variable  such as the poverty  rate  for re- 
gionj  (j  =  1, 2,  .  .  . 9) and  year  t (t  =  1967,  1968,  .  .  . 1991); Xj,  repre- 
sents a set of observed control variables, such as the unemployment 
rate, for the region and year; aj is a region-specific  fixed effect; 0, is a 
year-specific  fixed  effect; and  uj, is a region-  and  year-specific  error  com- 
ponent.  The region  effects capture  any permanent  differences  in the out- 
come variable  across regions, such as differences  in incomes due to re- 
gional differences in the cost of living. The year effects capture any 
aggregate  components  of the outcome variable  that are common  across 
regions in year t, such as differences  arising  from changes in the CPS 
questionnaire. 
There  are several  reasons  to prefer  pooled  time-series  cross-sectional 
estimates-such  as those estimated  from  equation  1-to  estimates  from 
a simple  regression  of the aggregate-level  outcome  on aggregate  explan- 
atory variables. As we just noted, the first is sample size: one cannot 
hope to identify the effects of more than a few explanatory  variables 
from  aggregate  regressions  based on twenty-five  or thirty  annual  obser- 
vations. Perhaps  more  importantly,  the use of pooled time-series  cross- 
sectional  data  allows us to include  unrestricted  year effects. These year 
effects control  for  any unobserved  aggregate-level  factors,  and  will elim- 
inate  biases in the estimated  betas arising  from  a correlation  between  the 
14. There  is no reason  to believe  that  the  nine  U.S. census  divisions  are  necessarily  the 
best regional  aggregation.  We use them  because  we believe that  a nine-region  breakdown 
captures  most of the geographic  variation  in growth  patterns  across the country  and be- 
cause there  are  enough  observations  at the regional  level to produce  reliable  estimates  of 
poverty  and  income  distribution  by family  type  using  the  CPS  sample.  In  addition,  the  CPS 
samples  do not separately  identify  all  fifty  states  before 1976. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  297 
components  of X and  unobserved  factors  that  affect the dependent  vari- 
able in all regions  in a given year. For example, errors  in the specifica- 
tion of equation 1 arising  from the use of a particular  price deflator  will 
tend to affect measured  real incomes or measured  poverty rates in all 
regions  of the country,  and will be absorbed  by the year  effects. 
On the minus side, it is conceivable that income and poverty in one 
region  depend not only on aggregate  conditions in that region, but on 
conditions  in neighboring  regions  or  throughout  the rest  of the country.  15 
In this case, the estimated  coefficients  from  a model such as equation 1 
will tend  to understate  the effect of aggregate  demand  on region-specific 
income  or poverty outcomes. A similar  problem  is created  by measure- 
ment error. If the region-level  Xs are estimated  with error, coefficient 
estimates  from equation 1 may be attenuated,  and some of the true ex- 
planatory  power of the Xs will be attributed  to the year effects. A third 
difficulty  arises if some of the X variables  are only observed  nationally. 
The effect of any purely  aggregate  variable  is not identifiable  in a model 
with  unrestricted  year effects. 
Given a set of parameter  estimates from equation 1, it is possible to 
investigate  whether  the year effects can themselves be explained  by ag- 
gregate-level  variables. Specifically, one can form a second stage re- 
gression 
(2)  &t  = Xt,y  + vt, 
where 0, represents  the estimated  year effect from  equation  1, X, repre- 
sents the aggregate  value of Xj, (that  is, the average  value across all re- 
gions), and v, is an error  term. It is important  to keep in mind  that the 
estimated coefficient vector y from this second-stage model is poten- 
tially  biased  by aggregate-level  error  components  that  happen  to be cor- 
related  with  X,. Nevertheless, estimation  results  from  the second-stage 
model may be informative,  particularly  if some components  of the Xj, 
vector are only available  at the national  level. 
15. Any variation  in labor  market  outcomes  within  regions  can lead  to an aggregation 
problem  that manifests  itself in a correlation  between outcomes in one region  and eco- 
nomic  conditions  in other  regions. For example,  poverty  and family  income  in southern 
Connecticut  presumably  depend  on labor  market  conditions  in New York,  as well as aver- 
age  conditions  in Connecticut.  This may  lead  to a dependence  of New England's  poverty 
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The Effect of Key Economic Variables on Income Distribution 
This section uses our regional  panel  data  set to investigate  the reduc- 
ed-form  relationship  between  two key economic  indicators-unemploy- 
ment  and  median  income-and  income distribution  within  regions.  The 
unemployment  rate  is widely used as an indicator  of the economic  cycle, 
particularly  in studies  of earnings.  16 Unemployment,  however, summa- 
rizes only one aspect of the economic cycle. Median  income can be in- 
terpreted  as a broader  indicator  of the state of the labor  market.  Changes 
in median  income  reflect  changes  in labor  force participation,  changes  in 
unemployment,  and changes in real wages, all of which vary over the 
cycle. The relationship  between  a measure  of the central  tendency  of in- 
come (such as the median)  and the lower tail of the distribution  is also 
of independent  interest  in light of the widespread  notion that economic 
growth  has a "trickle  down"  effect on lower-income  families. 
Unemployment and the Distribution  of Income 
At any point in the business cycle, unemployment  is unequally  dis- 
tributed  across the population,  with higher  unemployment  rates among 
lower-wage  workers.'7  Likewise, cyclical increases in unemployment 
fall disproportionately  on less skilled  workers.  For example, Blank  and 
Blinder  indicate  that  a one percentage  point  increase  in aggregate  unem- 
ployment  increases  unemployment  among  young  nonwhite  males  by 2.5 
to 3 percentage  points, whereas  it increases  unemployment  among  older 
females (who  typically  work  in less cyclical industries)  by only about  0.8 
percentage  points.  18 
Nevertheless, cyclical changes  in unemployment  translate  only indi- 
rectly  into  changes  in the distribution  of family  income. First, many  less- 
skilled  workers  live in families  with  other  workers,  spreading  the burden 
16. For example, Bils (1985)  and Blanchflower  and Oswald  (forthcoming)  study the 
effects of unemployment  on real  wages. 
17. For  example,  see Card  and  Riddell  (1993). 
18. Blank  and  Blinder's  analysis  (1986,  table  8.2) is based  on measures  of unemploy- 
ment constructed  from activities  during  the CPS survey week, whereas  our analysis  is 
based on measures  of unemployment  reported  retrospectively.  Levine (1992)  compares 
these measures and shows that contemporaneously  reported unemployment  among 
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of cyclical unemployment  across the income distribution.  Second, un- 
employment  of one family  member  can potentially  lead to an increase  in 
labor supply by other family members (the "added worker" effect). 
Third,  labor  earnings  contribute  a smaller  fraction  of total  family  income 
for families  at the bottom  of the income distribution,  implying  that  fam- 
ily income is less elastic with respect to unemployment  than family 
earnings. 
Simple  tabulations  suggest  that  although  unemployment  is correlated 
with the level of income among  low-income  families and thus with the 
poverty  rate,  it is less strongly  related  to their  relative  income  share.  The 
first panel of figure  5 plots the aggregate  unemployment  rate and our 
family unit poverty rate for the United States, while the second panel 
plots unemployment  and the share of total family income received by 
the first  two quintiles  of the distribution.  Movements  in the poverty  rate 
track  movements  in the unemployment  rate  rather  well, especially after 
1980.  Movements  in the income shares  of quintiles  1 and  2 are less obvi- 
ously correlated  with unemployment. 
A rise in aggregate  unemployment  has an  unambiguously  stronger  im- 
pact on the weeks of unemployment  reported  by families  at the bottom 
of the income distribution  than at the top. The upper  panel of table 4 
shows the coefficient on the regional  unemployment  rate from regres- 
sion models for total weeks of unemployment  reported  by family unit 
heads, by other  adult  family  members,  and  by all adult  family  members. 
These models are estimated  by quintile  using regional  observations  for 
1967-91,  and include  unrestricted  region  and year effects in addition  to 
the regional  unemployment  rate  as explanatory  variables. 
As indicated  in the row for all persons, a one percentage  point rise in 
the regional  unemployment  rate  raises  average  weeks of unemployment 
within a family unit by twice as much in quintile 1 as in quintile  5 (0.6 
weeks, compared  to 0.3 weeks).  9 There  is a substantial  difference  in the 
distribution  of cyclical unemployment  among  the heads of family  units 
and other family members, however. Among heads, the rise in weeks 
of unemployment  is heavily concentrated  at the bottom of the income 
distribution.  Among  other  adults, weeks of unemployment  rise more in 
the upper  quintiles  than  in the lower quintiles  as the average  unemploy- 
19. For reference, the average weeks of reported  unemployment  by quintile are: 
quintile  1,  4.0 weeks;  quintile  2, 3.6 weeks;  quintile  3, 3.3 weeks;  quintile  4, 3.0 weeks;  and 
quintile  5, 2.5 weeks. 300  Br-ookings  Paper-s  on  Ec onomic  Ac tivity,  2:1993 
Figure 5.  Comparing the Unemployment Rate to the Poverty Rate and First and Second 
Quintiles' Share of Income,  1967-91 
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Table 4.  Effect of the Unemployment Rate on Labor Market Outcomes 
by Quintile, 1967-91a 
Dependent  Famnily  Qiintile  Qin1tile  Qiintile  Qiintile  Quin1tile 
var  iable  subgr  ouip  All  1  2  3  4  5 
Total  weeks  Among  heads  0.254  0.492  0.333  0.232  0.148  0.061 
of  unem-  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.006) 
ployment  Among  other  0.207  0.133  0.162  0.222  0.274  0.251 
adults  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Among  all  0.461  0.625  0.495  0.454  0.422  0.312 
persons  (0.017)  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.021) 
Total  weeks  Among  heads  -0.374  -0.453  -0.759  -0.379  -0.194  -0.055 
of  em-  (0.043)  (0.071)  (0.099)  (0.067)  (0.039)  (0.035) 
ployment  Among  other  -0.250  -0.058  -0.128  -  0.227  -  0.373  -0.404 
adults  (0.045)  (0.036)  (0.065)  (0.075)  (0.085)  (0.104) 
Among  all  -  0.624  -0.511  -0.887  -0.606  -  0.567  -0.459 
persons  (0.063)  (0.087)  (0.124)  (0.099)  (0.094)  (0.113) 
Real  average  Among  employed  -  2.98  -  0.42  -  3.17  -  3.86  -  3.98  -  7.40 
weekly  heads  (1.18)  (0.87)  (1.14)  (1.31)  (1.27)  (2.21) 
earnings  Among  other  -  5.03  -0.75  -  1.47  -  2.28  -  5.29  -  7.56 
employed  (0.75)  (0.92)  (0.78)  (0.72)  (0.77)  (1.26) 
adults 
Mean  Among  heads  -  288  -  75  -334  -292  -  278  -  435 
earnings  (52)  (15)  (56)  (69)  (63)  (101) 
Among  other  -  169  -5  -  29  -  89  -  232  -488 
adults  (20)  (3)  (12)  (19)  (32)  (61) 
Among  all  -457  -  80  -362  -381  -  511  -  924 
persons  (65)  (16)  (63)  (75)  (82)  (135) 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  based on data from the March CPS files. 
a.  Entries are estimated regression coefficients  of the regional unemployment  rate for the dependent variable listed 
in each panel. Regressions  are fit to 225 region-by-year observations  based on data for the nine census  regions from 
1967-91.  All  regressions  include  unrestricted  region  and  year  effects.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  shown  in 
parentheses. 
ment rate rises. This occurs because many workers  affected by unem- 
ployment  are second or third  earners  in higher-income  households, and 
because higher-income  households  are far more  likely to have multiple 
earners. 
The second panel of table  4 shows that  among  all persons  the decline 
in weeks of employment  associated with a rise in aggregate  unemploy- 
ment  is quite  evenly spread  across the income  distribution.  This relative 
neutrality  across quintiles  arises through  offsetting  patterns  of employ- 
ment  losses for  heads  and  other  family  members.  Employment  losses for 302  Br-ookings Paper s on Ecoonomic  Activity, 2:1993 
heads  occur  primarily  at the bottom  of the income  distribution,  whereas 
employment  losses of other family members  occur more heavily at the 
top of the distribution.  Interestingly,  the decline in weeks of employ- 
ment  is consistently  larger  than  the increase  in weeks of unemployment 
for  the top four  quintiles,  implying  a predominant  "discouraged  worker" 
effect  for these quintiles.  In contrast,  in the bottom  quintile,  the increase 
in weeks of unemployment  is greater  than  the decrease in weeks of em- 
ployment,  implying  a predominant  "added  worker"  effect in this income 
range.20 
Increases  in unemployment  are also correlated  with declines in real 
average  weekly wages among  workers,  as seen in the third  panel  of table 
4.21  The combined effect of declining hours of work and falling real 
wages leads to substantial  declines in total earnings  as the unemploy- 
ment  rates rises. As shown in the fourth  panel of table  4, these declines 
occur across the income distribution,  although  they grow in absolute 
size as incomes increase. A one-point rise in the unemployment  rate 
leads to a loss of $80 in earnings  in quintile 1 and  a $924  loss of earnings 
in quintile  5. 
Table 5 summarizes  the effects of unemployment  on income and in- 
come shares  by quintile.  The  first  row  reproduces  the estimated  earnings 
changes associated with a percentage  point increase in unemployment 
among  all persons, as shown in the last row of table 4. The second row 
presents the mean levels of total family earnings  by quintile,  while the 
third  row shows the implied  percentage  effect of a unit  rise in unemploy- 
ment  on family  earnings.  These range  from - 3.7 percent  for quintiles 1 
and  2 to -  1.4  percent  for quintiles  4 and  5. 
The fourth  row presents estimates of the effect of unemployment  on 
total family income, drawing  on the specification  used in table 4. Be- 
cause family  income  equals  family  earnings  plus nonearned  income, any 
20. If the effects between  the pre-  and post-1980  periods  are separated,  virtually  the 
entire  "added  worker"  effect in the bottom  quintile  occurs after 1980.  This is consistent 
with other evidence (Blank, 1993)  indicating  that an expansion  in hours  of work among 
low-income  households  kept  family  incomes  higher  than  they would  otherwise  have  been. 
21. The mean  of average  weekly  wages  among  employed  heads  is $564.  Thus,  the esti- 
mated  coefficient  in the first  column  for employed  heads  implies  a -0.53  percent  fall in 
wages  for each percentage  point  increase  in unemployment.  The mean  of average  weekly 
wages  among  other  employed  family  members  is $291.  Thus, the estimate  in the first  col- 
umn  for other  employed  adults  implies  a -  1.73  percent  fall in wages for each percentage 
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Table 5.  Effect of Unemployment on Mean Earnings, Mean Income, 
and Share of Total Family Income by Quintile, 1967-91 
Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile 
Measure  All  1  2  3  4  5 
Estimated  effect of 
unemployment  on  -457  - 80  - 362  -381  -511  -924 
mean  earningsa  (65)  (16)  (63)  (75)  (82)  (135) 
Mean  earningsb  26,794  2,137  9,774  21,043  35,393  65,109 
Implied  percentage 
effectc  -  1.71  - 3.74  - 3.70  -  1.81  -  1.44  -  1.42 
Estimated  effect of 
unemployment  on  -456  - 89  - 274  - 340  -472  -  1,079 
mean  incomea  (68)  (21)  (53)  (63)  (80)  (152) 
Mean  incomeb  33,077  6,180  15,886  26,907  40,995  74,848 
Implied  percentage 
effectc  -  1.38  -  1.44  -  1.72  -  1.26  -  1.15  -  1.44 
Estimated  effect of 
unemployment  on 
quintile's  percentage  -0.00  -0.03  0.01  0.05  -0.01 
share  of total incomea  .  .  .  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  and regressions  based on March CPS data. 
a.  Estimated  regression  coefficients  on  the  regional  unemployment  rate for  mean earnings,  mean  income,  and 
percentage  share  of  total  income  as  dependent  variables,  respectively.  Regressions  are fit to  225  region-by-year 
observations  based on data for the nine census  regions from 1967-91. All regressions  include unrestricted region and 
year effects.  Estimated  standard errors are shown  in parentheses. 
b.  The mean from 1967-91,  expressed  in real 1991 dollars. 
c.  Ratios  of  estimated  regression  coefficients  of  the  first and fourth  rows  to  the  mean  levels  of  earnings  and 
income,  multiplied by  100. 
discrepancy  between the estimates  in the first  and  fourth  rows is attrib- 
utable  to cyclical patterns  in nonearned  income. Although  one might  ex- 
pect changes in nonearned  income to partially  offset changes in earned 
income (reflecting  unemployment  insurance and other income-tested 
transfer payments), this is only true for quintiles 2-4.  For all five 
quintiles,  the effect of unemployment  on income  is approximately  equal 
to its effect on earnings. 
The fifth row presents mean income levels by quintile  and the sixth 
row translates  the absolute effect of unemployment  on income into a 
percentage  effect. Ignoring  nonlabor  income, the percentage  effect of 
unemployment  on income  is the percentage  effect on earnings  multiplied 
by the share  of earnings  in income. The higher  elasticity  of earnings  with 
respect  to unemployment  in the lower quintiles  is almost  perfectly  offset 
by the  lower share  of earnings  in income, leading  to approximately  equal 304  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
percentage  changes in income for all five quintiles  after  a rise in unem- 
ployment. Because the effect of unemployment  on a quintile's  income 
share  is (approximately)  the percentage  effect of unemployment  on the 
quintile's average income minus the percentage  effect on average in- 
come for all quintiles,  unemployment  has only a trivial  effect on income 
shares.  This conclusion  is confirmed  by the estimated  coefficients  in the 
last row, which are obtained  by regressing  the quintile  income shares 
directly  on the regional  unemployment  rate. None of these coefficients 
is large  or statistically  significant. 
It may seem surprising  that unemployment  has such small  effects on 
the income distribution.  This is contrary  to the conclusion reached  by 
Blank and Blinder,22  for instance, who concluded that a rise in unem- 
ployment  has a widening  effect on the family  income distribution  from 
1958-83. In part, the differences  in our results stem from the inclusion 
of unrestricted  region  and year  effects. Indeed, when we exclude region 
and year effects, we obtain coefficient estimates that indicate a more 
negative effect of unemployment  on the shares of the lower quintiles. 
Inclusion  of these effects-particularly the region  effects-weakens  the 
unemployment  coefficient, suggesting  that regions  with higher  average 
unemployment  rates  tend to be the regions  with  greater  income  inequal- 
ity. Changes  in unemployment  over time, within  regions, have far less 
effect on the income distribution. 
Given the concern with changing  macroeconomic  effects during  the 
1980s, we have investigated  whether the effects of unemployment  on 
quintile income and income shares were different  after 1979. As sug- 
gested in the top panel of figure  5, the effects of unemployment  are, if 
anything,  slightly  stronger  after 1979  than  before. 
Finally, it is worth  emphasizing  that  even though  unemployment  has 
little effect on the relative  distribution  of income, it does affect  the levels 
of family income. Cyclical fluctuations  in unemployment  are a strong 
predictor of family incomes throughout  the income distribution.  As 
shown  in the fourth  row of table  5, each percentage  point  increase  in un- 
employment  is associated with a $456 decrease in average family in- 
come, equivalent  to a 1.4  percent  cut in income.  Again,  this  effect is mar- 
ginally stronger in the post-1979 period, suggesting that the linkage 
between the unemployment  rate and  family  income was stronger  in the 
1980s  than  in earlier  decades. 
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Table 6.  Effect of Median Income Change on Mean Income and Share of Total Family 
Income by Quintile, 1967-91 
Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile 
All  1  2  3  4  5 
Estimated  effect of 
median  income on  0.982  0.133  0.664  1.059  1.283  1.978 
mean  incomea  (0.037)  (0.014)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.049)  (0.103) 
Mean  incomeb  33,077  6,180  15,886  26,907  40,995  74,848 
Implied  percentage 
effect of $1,000 
increase  in median 
incomec  2.97  2.15  4.18  3.94  3.13  2.64 
Estimated  effect of 
median  income on 
quintile's  percentage  0.013  0.112  0.099  0.004  -0.095 
share of total incomea  .  .  .  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.029)  (0.055) 
Source:  Authors' calculations  and regressions  based on March CPS data. 
a.  Estimated  regression  coefficients  of  regional  median  income  for  mean income  and percentage  share of  total 
income  as dependent  variables,  respectively.  Regressions  are fit to  225 region-by-year  observations  based  on data 
for the  nine census  regions  from  1967-91.  All  regressions  include  unrestricted  region and year effects.  Estimated 
standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  The mean from  1967-91,  expressed  in real 1991 dollars. 
c.  The  ratio of estimated  regression  coefficients  in the first row to the  mean levels  of income  in the second  row, 
multiplied by  100. 
Median Income  Changes  and the Income  Distribution 
Although  the unemployment  rate appears  to have few effects on the 
overall  income  distribution,  this does not mean  that  there  are  no cyclical 
distributional  changes. Over  the cycle, changes  in labor  force participa- 
tion and/or real wages may occur independently  of changes in unem- 
ployment.  The level of median  family  income is often used as a more  in- 
clusive measure of family well-being, and in this section we briefly 
repeat  the analysis  of the previous  section using median  income, rather 
than  unemployment.23 
Table  6 repeats  the analysis  in table 5, using regional  changes in me- 
dian income as the key independent  variable.  The first row shows the 
response  of mean  income in each quintile  to a one dollar  increase  in me- 
dian  income. Median  income  growth  is not spread  evenly across the dis- 
tribution.  When  the median  grows by one dollar,  family  units  in the bot- 
tom quintile  experience only a $0.13 average  increase  in income, while 
23. We have run  regressions  in this section using  per capita  income, rather  than  me- 
dian  family  income, and obtained  very similar  results. Either  measure  seems to capture 
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those in the top quintile  experience a $1.98 income increase. The third 
row calculates  the implied  percentage  increase  in mean  income in each 
quintile  resulting  from  a $1,000  rise in median  family  income  (equivalent 
to a 3.7 percent  increase). In aggregate,  mean  family  incomes rise by 3 
percent when median family income grows by $1,000. The percent 
growth in the lowest quintile is only 2.2 percent, but the growth in 
quintiles  2 and 3 is larger.  The net result is a redistribution  away from 
the top and  bottom  quintiles  and  toward  quintiles  2 and 3. 
This effect is illustrated  by the coefficients  in the fourth  row of table 
6, which are obtained  by regressing  the quintile  income shares on re- 
gional real median  income. Growth  in the median  has no effect on in- 
come shares  at the very bottom, implying  that  not much  income  trickles 
this far down the income distribution.  Both quintiles  2 and 3, however, 
show significant  increases in their income share with median income 
growth,  while quintile  5 shows a significant  loss of income share. 
It is interesting  to note that if the post-1979  effects of median  income 
growth  are allowed  to differ  from  the earlier  period,  they show a weaker 
redistributional  effect, although  the coefficients  are still significant  and 
positive in quintiles  2 and 3. Thus, there is evidence that  the equalizing 
effect of median  income growth  has been weaker over the past decade 
than  it was in earlier  years, although  it has not disappeared  entirely. 
The Effects of Labor Market Changes 
on the Income Distribution 
The preceding  section followed a "reduced  form"  approach  to study- 
ing the connection between economic activity (summarized  by the un- 
employment  rate  or real median  income)  and  family  income. In this sec- 
tion, we broaden the inquiry to focus on more causal models. Our 
approach  is to take three outcomes from  the labor  market-the median 
hourly wage rate, the dispersion in hourly wages, and the unemploy- 
ment rate-and  treat  these as determinants  of the distribution  of family 
income. We recognize that hourly  wages and unemployment  rates are 
far  from  being  exogenous determinants  of family  income. Nevertheless, 
we believe there are important  lessons to be drawn  from studying  the 
linkage between wage and unemployment  outcomes and family in- 
comes. First, the level of real  wages is an  observable  measure  of produc- Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  307 
tivity. Thus, by studying  the effect of real wage growth on family in- 
comes and  poverty, we can test the extent to which  productivity  growth 
drives changes  in the distribution  of family  incomes.24  Second, there is 
a large literature  describing the expansion of wage inequality in the 
1980s and evaluating  alternative  explanations  for this phenomenon.25 
There is a separate  literature  focusing on the "productivity  slowdown" 
and the relative stagnation  of productivity  and wages in the United 
States since the mid-1970s.26  To the extent that  changes  in the level and 
distribution  of wages affect  family  income  distribution,  explanations  for 
recent  trends  in the level and/or  dispersion  of real  wages can also explain 
the trends  in income  distribution. 
We emphasize that there is no mechanical  connection between the 
level and  distribution  of wages, on one hand,  and the level and  distribu- 
tion of family  incomes, on the other. Intermediating  between  wage rates 
and  family  incomes  are  labor  supply  decisions, government  transfer  pol- 
icies, and  family  formation  decisions. The past  decade  has seen substan- 
tial shifts in all three areas. Thus, we believe it is useful to estimate the 
extent to which labor  market  forces alone (summarized  by wage levels 
and dispersion, and unemployment)  can explain changes in family in- 
come levels and  distribution. 
Our  data  on hourly  earnings  come from  the May CPS files  for 1973-78 
and from the "Merged  Monthly  Earnings  Supplements"  of the 1979-91 
CPS files.27  We use the median  of the logarithm  of hourly  wages as our 
measure  of the central  tendency in wages.28  We constructed  several al- 
ternative measures of wage dispersion for each region and year, in- 
cluding  the standard  deviation  of log wages, the gap between the nineti- 
eth and  tenth  percentiles  of log wages, and  the gap  between  the seventy- 
fifth and twenty-fifth  percentiles of log wages, the interquartile  range. 
However, problems  with the presence  of spikes in the wage distribution 
24. One could argue  that real compensation  is a better  measure  of productivity  than 
real  wages. Our  income  distribution  data  are  based  on cash income,  however,  and  are not 
affected  by most types of nonwage  compensation.  During  the 1980s,  compensation  per 
employee  shows a similar  trend  to wages and  salary  per  employee  in the National  Income 
and  Product  Accounts  data. 
25. See Levy and  Murnane  (1992). 
26. See Baily  and  Gordon  (1988). 
27. Comparable  wage  data  are  unavailable  before 1973. 
28. Hourly  wages  are  approximately  log-normally  distributed.  Thus,  the mean  and  me- 
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Figure 6.  Wage Dispersion in Selected Regions, 1973-91 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  based on data from May CPS files for  1973-78 and the  "Merged Monthly Earnings 
Supplements" CPS files for  1979-91. 
and with the effect of the minimum  wage on the lower percentiles of 
wages in some region29ed  us to use the standard  deviation  of log wages 
as a measure  of wage dispersion. 
Figure  6 plots our estimates  of wage dispersion  for the United States 
as a whole and for four selected regions. For most regions, the general 
pattern  of wage dispersion  is similar,  with a decline  from 1973  to 1979  or 
1980,  followed by a rapid  rise between 1980  and 1983.30  Nevertheless, 
there  are region-specific  components  of dispersion.  While  wage disper- 
sion in the Pacific  and east north  central  regions tracks  aggregate  U.S. 
wage dispersion  closely, the level and  the trends  in wage dispersion  are 
different  in New England  and  the east south  central  states. 
29. See DiNardo  and  Lemieux  (1993). 
30. Our  wage dispersion  measures  are not strictly  comparable  to others  in the litera- 
ture  for at least three  reasons.  First,  our  measures  are  based  on reported  hourly  or weekly 
earnings  for an individual's  main  job, rather  than  on total  earnings  and  weeks of employ- 
ment  in the previous  year. Second, we compute  the dispersion  of wages  over all workers, 
not  just full-time,  full-year  males. Third,  we do not attempt  to separate  the "explained" 
and  "unexplained"  components  of wage  variance. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  309 
Table 7.  Effects of Median Wages, Wage Dispersion, and Unemployment on Mean 
Earnings, Mean Income, and Income Shares by Quintile,  197391a 
Dependent  Independent  Quintile  Qiintile  Quintile  Qiintile  Qiintile 
variable  var  iable  All  1  2  3  4  5 
Mean  Median log wage  16,603  1,745  7,452  15,546  22,681  37,242 
earnings  (1,445)  (406)  (1,030)  (1,414)  (2,139)  (4,172) 
Wage dispersionb  -  1,319  -  1,584  -7,897  -5,943  6,202  33,632 
(5,249)  (1,670)  (4,209)  (4,561)  (8,388)  (16,791) 
Unemployment  -387  - 51  - 270  -240  - 438  - 872 
rate  (43)  (15)  (30)  (39)  (59)  (127) 
Mean income  Median log wage  18,279  3,165  9,343  16,174  23,921  42,511 
(1,556)  (547)  (992)  (1,356)  (2,204)  (5,078) 
Wage dispersionb  1,197  -3,106  -7,750  3,808  13,028  32,646 
(5,651)  (2,251)  (4,054)  (5,237)  (8,540)  (20,436) 
Unemployment  -  379  - 26  - 218  - 275  - 428  - 970 
rate  (46)  (20)  (29)  (37)  (60)  (155) 
Income  Median log wage  . . .  -0.411  0.171  0.440  -  1.152  - 5.672 
shares  (0.301)  (0.468)  (0.598)  (0.804)  (1.536) 
Wage dispersionb  .  .  .  -1.885  -2.716  3.017  10.650  15.381 
(1.237)  (1.911)  (2.308)  (3.114)  (6.183) 
Unemployment  ...  0.009  -0.027  0.002  0.004  -0.115 
rate  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.047) 
Source: Authors'  regressions  based  on March  CPS  data. 
a. Entries  are estimated  regression  coefficients  for the given independent  variable  listed  to its left and based  on 
the dependent  variable  shown  in the first  column.  Regressions  are fit to 171  region-by-year  observations,  based  on 
data  for the nine census regions  from 1973-91.  All regressions  include  unrestricted  region  and year  effects, as well 
as controls  for the percent  of family  units  in central  city and  rural  areas;  the percent  of family  units  headed  by single 
females  and elderly  individuals;  and the average  education,  percent  married,  and percent  black  among  family  unit 
heads. Estimated  standard  errors  are shown  in parentheses. 
b. Wage  dispersion  is defined  as the standard  deviation  of log wages. 
Table 7 presents estimated  regression  coefficients  from models that 
relate mean family earnings,  mean family income, and family income 
shares by quintile  within each region to regional  wage levels, regional 
wage dispersion,  and regional  unemployment  rates. These regressions 
thus control  for the level and distribution  of productivity,  as well as the 
availability  of job opportunities  in the regional  labor market. Not re- 
ported in table 7, but also included  in the regression  models, are unre- 
stricted  region and year effects, as well as a set of seven demographic 
control  variables  based  on the average  characteristics  of families  or  fam- 
ily heads  in each region-quintile-family  type cell.  We defer  a discussion 
of the demographic  control  variables  to the next section. 
31. These  controls  are  the percent  of family  heads  that  are  black;  the percent  of family 
units  in a central  city; the percent  of family  units  outside  a metropolitan  area;  the percent 
of family  units  headed  by a single  female;  the percent  of family  units  headed  by an elderly 
person;  the percent  of family  heads that are married;  and the average  education  level of 
the  family  head. 310  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
The upper  panel  of table 7 shows the effects of median  wages, wage 
dispersion,  and unemployment  on mean earnings  within  each quintile. 
The estimated  median  wage coefficients  confirm  that higher  real wages 
lead to higher  earnings  across the income distribution.  To interpret  the 
coefficients,  consider  the effect of a 0.05 increase  in median  log wages, 
which is about the range  of variation  in aggregate  real wages over our 
sample  period. A 5 percent increase in median  wages increases mean 
earnings  by about  $87 (4.1 percent)  in the bottom  quintile  of the income 
distribution,  and  by about  $1,862  (2.9 percent)  in the top quintile. 
The coefficients of the wage dispersion measure show that higher 
wage  dispersion  has a negative  effect on the earnings  of low-income  fam- 
ilies and  a positive effect on the earnings  of higher-income  families.  Dur- 
ing the 1980s, the standard  deviation of log wages rose by about 0.05. 
The estimated  coefficients suggest that this change  lowered the annual 
earnings of quintile 1 by $79 (3.7 percent), lowered the earnings of 
quintile  2 by $395  (4.0 percent), and raised  the earnings  of quintile  5 by 
about  $1,682  (2.6 percent). 
Finally,  as suggested  by the regressions  in table  5, the unemployment 
coefficients  in the upper  panel  of table  7 show that  higher  unemployment 
reduces average family earnings  across the income distribution,  with 
larger  percentage  effects for the two lower quintiles.  A one percentage 
point rise in unemployment  lowers family earnings  by 2.4 percent in 
quintile  1, 2.8 percent  in quintile  2, and  by 1.1 to 1.3  percent  in quintiles 
3, 4, and  5. 
The effects of these labor market  changes on mean incomes within 
each quintile  are shown in the second panel of table 7. Median  wage 
growth  leads to somewhat  larger  percentage  increases in earnings  than 
income  for all quintiles,  although  the coefficient  estimates  are relatively 
imprecise. Similarly,  a rise in unemployment  has a smaller  percentage 
effect on income than on earnings-much  smaller in quintile 1-re- 
flecting  the fact that some lost earnings  are replaced  through  unemploy- 
ment  insurance  and  other  public  transfers.  The sign  of the effect of wage 
dispersion  on income is the same as on earnings  except for quintile  3. 
The third panel of table 7 shows how these labor market changes 
translate  into changes  in income shares  across the quintiles.  The growth 
in earnings  and  income that occurs with a rise in median  wages leads to 
some equalization,  with a redistribution  of income away from the top 
quintile  and toward  the second and third  quintiles. The effect of wage Rebecca M. Blank  and David Card  311 
dispersion  is more clearly redistributive  and is disequalizing.  A rise in 
wage  dispersion  decreases  the income  shares  of the bottom  two quintiles 
and  increases  the income shares  of the top three  quintiles.  As in table 5, 
changes  in unemployment  have little effect on the overall  income  distri- 
bution. 
Our  empirical  analysis  thus  confirms  that  the level and  distribution  of 
family  earnings  are directly  affected  by the level and  distribution  of real 
wages. Real wage growth has a modest equalizing  effect on family in- 
comes, whereas increases in wage dispersion  have a significant  widen- 
ing  effect on the distribution  of family  incomes. Between 1979  and 1989, 
median  wages grew slightly, unemployment  fell slightly, and the stan- 
dard deviation of log wages rose substantially.  According  to our esti- 
mates, the net effect of these labor market  changes was to widen the 
family  income distribution. 
One way to see how far these labor market  changes can go toward 
explaining  the observed changes in the distribution  of family incomes 
during  the past two decades is to compare  the actual  changes  in the ag- 
gregate  income shares  of the five quintiles  to the "unexplained"  year ef- 
fects that  remain  when we have controlled  for observed  changes  in me- 
dian wages, the dispersion of wages, and unemployment. Figure 7 
graphs  the actual  changes  in income shares  for each quintile  (solid  line), 
and the "unexplained"  portion of these changes that remain  in our re- 
gressions  once we have controlled  for the variables  in our  equation  (dot- 
ted line).32  As the figure  indicates, the inclusion  of the control  variables 
explains  a significant  fraction  of the downward  trend  in income  shares  in 
quintiles 1-3 and virtually  the entire increase in the income share of 
quintile  5. However, changes in the labor  market  actually  predict  a rise 
in the income  share  of quintile  4, whereas  the fourth  quintile's  share  fell. 
Thus, the unexplained  downward  trend in quintile  4 is larger  than the 
actual  downward  trend. 
To summarize,  labor  market  developments  can explain  some, but  not 
all, of the changes in the family income distribution  between 1973  and 
1991.  There is little evidence that the income distribution  has become 
less responsive to changes in the labor market.  The dominant  trend  in 
the labor  market  during  the past decade  has been rising  wage  dispersion, 
and this has had a profound effect on the aggregate distribution  of 
income. 
32. The  income  share  changes  and  unexplained  components  are  relative  to 1973. 312  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
Figure 7.  Changes in Quintile Shares, Actual and Unexplained  a 
Percentage change from 1973 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on March  CPS  data. 
a. Each panel  plots the actual  changes  in income shares  for each quintile  and the unexplained  portion  of those 
changes  that  remain  in the regressions  once the authors  have controlled  for labor  market  changes. 
The Effect of Changing  Family  Composition 
Family composition  has changed substantially over the past twenty- 
five years.  More individuals live outside of nuclear families,  and more 
families have a single person as their head. It is often suggested that the 
splintering of American families has contributed to the rise in family in- 
come inequality. Indeed, even if the distribution of incomes across indi- Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  313 
viduals  were fixed,  a rise in the fraction  of smaller,  poorer  families  (com- 
posed of families  headed  by females or single individuals  living on their 
own) would increase  family income inequality  by widening  the gap be- 
tween the incomes of smaller  and  larger  families. 
To investigate  the effect of changes  in family  composition,  we calcu- 
lated a family-composition  constant  mean income series for all families 
and  for  families  in each income  quintile.  We calculated  this series  by tak- 
ing the 1967  population  share of each family type in each quintile  and 
assuming  that these population  shares remained  constant for the next 
twenty-five  years. Thus, our  family-composition  constant  income series 
allows the level of income within  each family type and quintile  to vary 
over time, but assumes that the relative shares of the family types in 
each quintile  are fixed. 
It should  be noted  that  this income series provides  only a partial  mea- 
sure of mean income for a particular  quintile  in the absence of family 
composition changes. We are unable to  account for the effect of 
changing  family composition  on the quintile  breakpoints  in the income 
distribution.  A rise in the relative number of single-headed  families 
would be expected to lower the entire distribution  of family incomes, 
leading  to a change  in the quintile  breakpoints.  Our  family-composition 
constant index can only account for the differences in mean incomes 
across different  family  types in the same (fixed)  income intervals.  How- 
ever, this problem  does not affect  the  family-composition  constant  mean 
income calculation  for all quintiles. 
Table  8 shows how quintile-specific  mean  incomes  and  income shares 
would  have changed  from 1967-91  if family  composition  were held con- 
stant  and  compares  these changes  to the actual  changes  over the period. 
Between 1967  and 1991,  average  family  unit  income rose by $4,505. We 
estimate  that the growth  would have been $9,293  if family  composition 
had  held constant.  Thus  changing  family  composition  has led to a $4,788 
(or 14 percent) decline in mean family income during the past two 
decades. 
The calculations  by quintile  suggest that income in the bottom four 
quintiles  would have been higher  and income in the top quintile  would 
have been lower if family  composition  were constant. Thus, changes in 
family  composition  have had  the effect of increasing  inequality  in the in- 
come distribution.  Nevertheless, because we are unable  to account for 
the effects of changing  family composition  on the quintile  breakpoints, 314  Brookings Pcapers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 8.  Changes in Mean Income and Income Shares by Quintile, 1967-91 a 
Quintile  Quiintile  Quintile  Quiintile  Quiintile 
Measurle and uniits  All  1  2  3  4  5 
Change in 1991 dollars 
Actual mean income  4,505  267  -904  124  4,486  15,437 
Family-composition 
constant  mean 
incomeb  9,293  537  -  796  398  4,851  15,123 
Percentage  change 
Actual income  share  .  -  0.34  -  1.98  -  2.27  -  0.68  3.33 
Family-composition 
constant  income 
shareb  .  .  .  -  0.13  -1.76  -1.85  -  0.08  3.82 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on March  CPS  data. 
a. Entries  represent  dollar  changes  (measured  in 1991  dollars)  in mean  income  or percentage  changes  in income 
shares  from 1967  to 1991. 
b. Family-composition  constant  income  represents  a fixed-weight  average  of incomes  by family  unit  type, where 
the weights  are the shares  of the family  unit  type in the quintile  in 1967. 
the estimated  impact  of reweighting  mean  incomes  by family  type within 
fixed income  ranges  is quite small.33 
We have also estimated the responses of family-composition  con- 
stant  incomes  by quintile  to changes  in unemployment  rates, real  wages, 
and wage dispersion. In general, the family-composition  constant in- 
come series show the same responses as the unadjusted  income series. 
There is no indication  that changing  family  composition  has dampened 
the responsiveness  of family  incomes to labor  market  changes. 
Our  conclusion is that family-composition  changes have had a sub- 
stantial  effect on the level of average  family  income, and  some widening 
effect on the income distribution.  We are unable  to give a precise esti- 
mate of the effect of changing  family  composition  on the income shares 
of different  quintiles. However, changes in family composition  do not 
seem to have contributed  to any weakening  of the relation  between  labor 
market  conditions  and  family  income. 
What Affects the Poverty Rate? 
So far, we have concentrated  our analysis on the level and distribu- 
tion of family  income. In the remainder  of the paper,  we shift our  focus 
33. Note that  the weighted  average  of differences  within  quintiles  between  actual  in- 
come growth  and family-composition  constant  income growth  is much smaller  than the 
average  difference  for all quintiles.  This reflects  the limitation  of our  family-composition 
constant  quintile  income  series, which  do not account  for changes  in quintile  breakpoints 
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Figure 8.  Poverty Rate and Real Income Deviation in the First Quintile, 1967-91 
Percent  Percent  deviation 
16.5  0.08 
16.0  0.06 
12 5  |  l  |  "  |  -~~I0.06 
15.5 
0.04 
15.0  /  \ 1 
I  ~~~~~~~0.02 
14.5 
Sore  uhr'  cluaion  bae  on MacIPaa 
I  I  I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.00 
14.0  Poverty  rate  relc 
13.5ges  in the  owe  tai  ofthe  ncoe  ditriutio.35As  apratica  ma-0.02 
13.0  wtReal  income  deviation'  -0.04 
12.5  I  1  -0.06 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on March CPS data. 
a.  Real income  deviation  equals the negative  deviation  from the average of log real income for the first quintile. 
to the poverty  rate. The  poverty  rate  is simply  the fraction  of family  units 
with real incomes below a fixed income threshold  based on family size 
and  composition.3  Consequently,  movements  in the poverty  rate  reflect 
both changes in the mean or median of family incomes and relative 
changes  in the lower tail  of the income  distribution.3  As a practical  mat- 
ter, changes  in the poverty rate reflect  changes  in the mean  level of real 
income  for the first  quintile  of family  incomes. This  is illustrated  in figure 
8, where  we have plotted  the poverty  rate  for 1967-9  1  for  all  family  units, 
along  with the negative  percentage  deviation  of real income  for quintile 
1  from  its average  value  over the time  period.  (We  use the negative  devi- 
ation  because  poverty  rises when  incomes  fall.) The correspondence  be- 
tween the two series is quite remarkable.  In our  panel  of 225 region  and 
34. For a fuller  discussion  of issues involved  in the definition  of poverty,  see Ruggles 
(1990). 
35. If family  income  adjusted  for  family  size, y, is distributed  with  distribution  function 
F(y -  m)ls), where  m is the mean  of income  and  s is the standard  deviation,  then  the pov- 
erty  rate  is F((P -  m)ls), where  P is the poverty  line. Note that  the derivative  of the pov- 
erty rate with respect to a determinant  of m or s will vary, depending  on the density of 
families  near  the  poverty  rate.  During  the past  two decades,  the poverty  rate  has  fluctuated 
in a relatively  narrow  range  (13-17 percent),  so it is not unreasonable  to assume  that  the 
poverty  rate  had  a fixed  relationship  with  the determinants  of the mean  and  dispersion  of 
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year observations,  the correlation  between the poverty rate and the log 
of the mean  income of quintile  1 is - 0.96. 
The Determinants  of Poverty Rates 
Previous  research  has analyzed  the connection  between poverty  and 
economic growth by using annual time series observations for the 
United States as a whole. Our  approach,  using  data  for regions  over the 
1967-91  period, expands the available sample by a factor of nine and 
allows us to control  for unobserved  factors that are common  across re- 
gions and are possibly correlated  with poverty and observed economic 
changes.  Table  9 presents  a series of regressions  for  the regional  poverty 
rate. Equations  9-1 through  9-4 are estimated  over the 1967-91  period, 
while equations  9-5 through  9-8 are estimated  over the 1973-91  subsam- 
ple. Most of the specifications  include unrestricted  region and year ef- 
fects, as well as the demographic  control  variables  described  in the notes 
to table  7. 
As shown in equation 9-1, without controls for region and year ef- 
fects, poverty is only weakly related  to unemployment.  The addition  of 
region and year effects and family characteristics,  shown in equation 
9-2, leads to a significant  positive relation.36  This contrast  suggests that 
other  omitted  factors  have confounded  the link  between  poverty  and  un- 
employment,  and that these factors  are captured  by family  characteris- 
tics and  common  year  effects across regions.  Poverty  is also strongly  re- 
lated to median family income, as shown in equations 9-2 and 9-3. 
Controlling  for median income, in fact, unemployment  exerts only a 
small  and statistically  insignificant  effect on overall  poverty  rates. 
Equations 9-5 through 9-8 estimate the effects of  labor market 
changes (summarized  by median  log wages, the standard  deviation of 
log wages, and  the unemployment  rate)  on poverty. As in the models  for 
the quintile shares, all three variables  are significantly  related to pov- 
erty. A one percentage  point rise in regional  unemployment  leads to a 
0.2 percentage  point increase in the regional  poverty rate. A 0.05 in- 
crease in median  wages leads to a 0.4 to 0.6 percentage  point  reduction 
in poverty. Most dramatically,  a 0.05 increase  in the regional  dispersion 
in wages is associated with a 0.9 to 1.0 percentage  point increase in 
poverty. 
36. The  addition  of year  effects alone  leads  to an estimated  unemployment  coefficient 
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Although  the coefficients are not reported  in the table, many of the 
demographic  controls included  in the models in table 9 are highly sig- 
nificant.  For example, in equation  9-6, the average  education  of family 
heads  has  a coefficient  of - 3.1 with  a t-statistic  of 4.9, while  the percent- 
age of black  family  heads has a coefficient  of 0.3 with a t-statistic  of 3.2. 
The effects of two variables  measuring  the fraction  of families in rural 
areas and the fraction  in central city areas are especially noteworthy. 
Some recent literature  has stressed the growing  isolation of inner-city 
neighborhoods  from the rest of the economy and argued  that this isola- 
tion has weakened  the link between poverty and average  labor market 
conditions.37  Contrary  to this story, our  regressions  show that  increases 
in the fraction  of the population  in central  city areas  are actually  associ- 
ated  with significantly  lower  poverty  rates. On  the other  hand,  decreases 
in the fraction  of the rural  population  are  also associated  with  reductions 
in poverty. Thus, as has been the case through  much  of the century,  ur- 
banization  has been associated  with less, rather  than  more, poverty. 
Poverty Rates  and Changes  in Family  Composition 
As noted  earlier,  the trend  toward  smaller  families  with  fewer earners 
per family has led to lower average  family incomes. This, in turn, has 
presumably  led to higher  poverty rates. One way to quantify  this effect 
is to compute family composition-constant  poverty rates. Following 
Blank's 1993  work, we constructed  a constant-weight  poverty rate, us- 
ing actual poverty rates for each family type in each year weighted  by 
their 1967  population  shares.38  We also constructed  an alternative  fixed 
family-weight  poverty rate using 1991  family shares. The comparison 
between  our  actual  poverty  rate  for the United States and  the two fixed- 
weight  poverty  indexes is shown  in figure  9. Whereas  the actual  poverty 
rate was about  the same in 1970  and 1991,  the constant-weight  indexes 
both show a steady downward  trend:  about  2.5 percentage  points lower 
in 1991  than 1970  using  the 1967  weights, or 3.5 percentage  points lower 
using  the 1991  weights. Thus, changing  family  composition  has led to a 
secular  upward  trend  in measured  poverty rates. During  the economic 
37. The aggregate  importance  of this effect is questionable,  however,  given that less 
than 10 percent  of the poor live in readily  classifiable  urban  ghetto areas. See Jargowski 
and  Bane  (1991,  table  5, p. 251). 
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expansion  of the 1980s,  for example, changes  in family  composition  led 
poverty rates to decline 0.2 to 0.5 percentage  points more slowly than 
they would  have otherwise.39 
While family composition changes affect the level of poverty, they 
have much less effect on the responsiveness of poverty to economic 
changes. Columns  7 and 8 show regression  results  for the same specifi- 
cation as in column 6, fit to the 1967-weighted  and 1991-weighted  pov- 
erty  indexes. The results  are  very similar  to the estimates  obtained  using 
the actual  (varying-composition)  poverty index. 
A second way to evaluate  the effect of changing  composition  is to fit 
models to the poverty rates by family  type. The results of this exercise 
are presented  in table 10. All five family  types show a negative  effect of 
median  wage growth  and a positive effect of wage dispersion  on mea- 
sured  poverty rates, as shown in the second and third  rows. However, 
the effect of unemployment  (which is positive for all family types to- 
gether)  ranges  from a strong  negative  for families  headed  by an elderly 
39. The actual  poverty  rate  index shows a fall of 2.6 percentage  points  in poverty  be- 
tween 1983  and 1989.  The i967-weighted  index  shows a 2.8 percentage  point  fall, while  the 
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Table 10.  Determinants of Poverty Rates by Family Type,  1973-91a 
Single heads  Married  couples 
Elderly  No  No 
Independent  variableb  heads  Children  children  Children  children 
Regional unemployment  rate  -0.46  0.95  0.47  0.26  0.05 
(0.10)  (0.18)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Median log wage in region  -4.08  -27.86  -  14.53  -5.00  -4.44 
(3.26)  (6.00)  (3.14)  (2.06)  (1.80) 
Regional wage dispersion  14.02  22.87  18.61  10.86  8.06 
(13.81)  (26.11)  (13.97)  (8.19)  (7.15) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.97  0.85  0.86  0.92  0.83 
Addendum 
Mean poverty rate  16.86  41.86  18.89  7.44  3.67 
(6.01)  (5.20)  (2.84)  (2.43)  (1.43) 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  based on March CPS data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  regional  poverty  rate  for  the  specified  family  type.  All  samples  contain  171 
observations.  Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors, except  for the last row, which shows  standard deviations 
for the poverty  rates. 
b.  All regressions  include  region and year effects,  as  well as  family and head characteristics.  Characteristics  of 
families  and heads  of  families,  included  in all regressions,  are: percent  of  families  headed  by  nonwhites;  average 
education  of family head; percent of families  located  in central city  areas: and percent of families  located  in rural 
areas. 
person to a strong  positive for families headed by a single person with 
children.  One  interesting  pattern  in this  table  is that  poverty  rates  of fam- 
ilies headed  by a single  person  are  more responsive to economic change 
than the poverty rates of other family types.40  Other  things equal, the 
responsiveness  of poverty rates to economic changes in the labor  mar- 
ket would  have been expected  to increase  with  the rising  fraction  of fam- 
ilies headed  by a single  person. This is confirmed  by the comparison  be- 
tween equations 9-7 and 9-8 in table 9: poverty rates using the 1991 
weights (which  give more  weight  to single-headed  families)  are more  re- 
sponsive  to labor  market  changes  than  poverty  rates  using 1967  weights. 
The Impact  of Transfers on Poverty 
There  was a substantial  public debate in the mid-1980s  about the ef- 
fect of transfers  on poverty. Charles  Murray  claimed  that government 
40. Note that  a comparison  of mean  poverty  rates  by family  type (top  row  of the table) 
with the coefficient  estimates  by family  type suggests  that the coefficients  are (roughly) 
proportional  to the mean  level of poverty. Rebecca  M. Blank and David  Card  321 




female  Married 
head  couple 
All  Elderly  Unrelated  with  with 
Year  persons  petsons  individualsb  childr  en  children 
1979-80  -7.8  - 38.8  -  16.2  -9.7  -2.5 
1982-83  -7.9  -37.2  -15.6  -7.1  -3.0 
1988-89  -7.2  -  36.0  -14.6  -6.1  -  2.0 
1990-91  -7.3  -35.1  -14.5  -6.4  -2.1 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  of poverty  rates with and without government  cash transfers,  as reported in U.S. 
Bureau of the Census  (1992b, table 2). 
a.  Entries represent the two-year  average difference  between  the actual poverty  rate and the pretransfer poverty 
rate, calculated  by excluding  all government  cash transfers from measured family income. 
b.  Unrelated individuals include elderly  persons  living alone. 
antipoverty  policies actually  led to an increase  in poverty.4'  We cannot 
directly  test the role of transfers  in our region-based  regression  models 
because we have no reliable  data  on public  transfers  by region  over the 
years. Thus, the effect of transfers  is subsumed  in our time effects, and 
is implicitly  assumed  to be the same across regions  in every year. 
In recent  years, the U.S. Bureau  of the Census  has calculated  alterna- 
tive poverty rates  with and without  government  cash transfers  factored 
into family income. Comparisons  of these poverty rates, illustrated  in 
table 11 for a few key groups, show that government  cash transfers 
moved 7 to 8 percent of the population  out of poverty during  the past 
decade. Among the elderly, more than one-third  escaped poverty be- 
cause of government  transfers.  Among  families  headed  by married  cou- 
ples-for  whom fewer transfers  are available-only  2 to 3 percent es- 
caped poverty because of transfers.  Comparing  1979-80  with 1988-89, 
the effect of transfer  programs  in reducing  poverty changed  relatively 
little over the decade, except among households headed by single fe- 
males  with  children.  For that  group,  transfers  reduced  poverty  by nearly 
10  percent  at the start  of the decade, but only 6 percent  at the end. 
As noted earlier, although  we cannot include aggregate  transfer  ex- 
penditures  in our regional equations, we can perform  a second-stage 
analysis  relating  the estimated  year effects from  our poverty models to 
transfer  spending  and other aggregate  variables. This analysis shows 
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that  the unexplained  aggregate  components  of poverty  that  remain  after 
controlling  for observed labor market  changes are only weakly related 
to transfer  spending,  although  with a positive effect, rather  than  a nega- 
tive one. Detailed data on transfer programs  by region are clearly 
needed to provide  further  evidence on this issue. Nevertheless, we be- 
lieve that  the modest  changes  in transfer  policies over the 1980s,  as illus- 
trated  in table 11, probably  do not lead to significant  biases in our  analy- 
sis of regional  poverty  outcomes. 
Summarizing the Effects  of Labor Market Changes  on Poverty 
Following  our approach  in figure  7, we can summarize  the contribu- 
tion of measured  changes in the labor market  to the course of poverty 
rates by comparing  the actual changes in poverty rates to the unex- 
plained  changes  that  remain  after  controlling  for changes  in the level and 
dispersion  of wages, and the unemployment  rate. Because much  of the 
literature  has  focused on changes  over the 1980s,  we conducted  the anal- 
ysis over the period 1979-89. Both the starting  and ending years were 
cyclical peaks. The unemployment  rate of 5.3 percent in 1989 was 
slightly  lower than the 5.8 percent rate in 1979,  while the average  level 
of real  wages was also slightly  lower in 1989,  $8.81  per  hour  versus $9.23 
per hour-in  1991  dollars. 
Our  results are presented  in table 12. We show the actual  change in 
poverty in the first column. The second column shows the predicted 
change in poverty between 1979  and 1989, using the coefficients from 
the models presented  in tables 9 and 10.42  We predict  the change in the 
poverty rate over this decade that would have occurred  solely because 
of changes in the three labor  market  variables  (wage levels and disper- 
sion, and unemployment),  holding constant family characteristics  at 
their 1979  level. The third  column  shows the residual  change  in poverty 
that  occurs exclusive of labor  market  changes. 
The first  row of table 12 suggests  that labor  market  changes over the 
1980s  predicted  a larger  rise in poverty than actually occurred. For all 
families, our model suggests that economic changes would have raised 
poverty rates by 0.8 percentage  point. The actual poverty rate rose by 
42. The first  through  third  rows of table 12  are based on estimated  coefficients  in the 
sixth through  eighth  columns  of table  9, respectively.  The fourth  through  eighth  rows are 
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Table 12.  Actual and Predicted Changes in Poverty Rates from 1979 to 1989a 
Percentage  points 
Predicted  change 
Actual change  from labor  Unexplained 
Family type  in poverty  market  change 
All  0.4  0.8  -0.4 
All (fixed 1967  weights)b  -0.3  0.7  -  1.0 
All (fixed 1991  weights)c  -0.5  0.8  -  1.3 
Elderly  heads  -4.6  1.0  - 5.6 
Single heads with children  2.8  0.6  2.2 
Single heads without  children  -0.6  0.7  -  1.3 
Married  couples with children  1.3  0.5  0.8 
Married  couples without  children  0.3  0.4  -0.1 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on March CPS data and tables 9 and 10. 
a.  Entries are differences  in poverty  rates from  1979 to  1989. 
b.  Poverty  rates are fixed-weighted,  using  1967 family-composition  fractions as the weights. 
c.  Poverty  rates are fixed-weighted,  using  1991 family-composition  fractions as the weights. 
only 0.4 point; thus nonlabor  market  factors contributed  to an "unex- 
plained"  reduction  in poverty of 0.4 point. The conclusion  is similar  al- 
though  even stronger  using  fixed-weight  poverty indexes that  hold fam- 
ily composition  constant. Labor  market  changes would have increased 
poverty, while actual poverty fell in these data. This implies that non- 
market  factors  led to a decline  in poverty  of between 1.0  and 1.3  percen- 
tage points. 
This analysis  for all family  types hides substantial  differences  among 
a very heterogeneous  poverty  population.  The fourth  row indicates  that 
elderly  households  were the main  source  of the "unexplained"  reduction 
in poverty. From 1979  to 1989,  poverty  rates  among  elderly-headed  fam- 
ilies fell 4.6 points. Our  models suggest  that  labor  market  changes  alone 
would have increased elderly poverty; thus there is a sizable unex- 
plained  decline, consistent with continuing  expansion  in the nonearned 
income available to the elderly. A similar  story emerges for childless 
families headed by single people. Among single heads with children, 
however, the opposite pattern  emerges;  actual  poverty rates  rose faster 
than  can be explained  by labor  market  changes  alone. 
Tables 10 and 12 suggest that labor market  effects on poverty vary 
widely  among  different  groups  of the poor. Changes  in the labor  market 
have the largest impacts  on poverty among single-parent  families with 
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The observed  trends  in poverty over the 1980s  are at least partially  ex- 
plained  by changing  labor market  opportunities  facing the poor, with 
falling  unemployment  rates, offset by rising  wage  dispersion  and  flat  me- 
dian  wage  levels. Certain  groups,  particularly  the elderly  and  single-par- 
ent families, experienced  substantial  changes in poverty due to factors 
other  than  labor  market  change,  although  the labor  market  changes  were 
clearly  important  for all groups. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We began  this paper  with  a reduced-form  analysis  of the effects of un- 
employment  on the income distribution.  We found that each one per- 
centage  point  increase  in unemployment  is associated  with  a 1.4  percent 
decline in average  family income. Contrary  to previous  research,  how- 
ever, we found that these income losses were uniformly  spread  across 
the income distribution.  Cyclical increases in unemployment  led to 
greater  increases in unemployment  among poorer families. However, 
cyclical  changes  in employment  were more  evenly distributed  across the 
income distribution.  Because of this fact, and the fact that earnings  are 
a smaller  fraction  of total  family  income  for poorer  families,  the percent- 
age income losses attributable  to unemployment  were almost equally 
distributed  across families. We also analyzed  the effects of median  in- 
come growth using a similar  reduced-form  approach,  and found that 
growth  of median  income has generally  been associated with a modest 
narrowing  of the family  income distribution. 
A more  causal  model  of income  dispersion  was estimated  by focusing 
on three key labor market  factors: the level of hourly  wages, their dis- 
persion,  and  the unemployment  rate. We found  that  increases  in median 
wages were associated  with a slight  narrowing  of the overall  income  dis- 
tribution.  This effect persisted  through  the 1980s,  although  it was some- 
what weaker than in earlier  years. Increases in wage dispersion  had a 
significant  redistributive  effect on family  earnings  and  incomes;  we esti- 
mated  that the growth  of wage inequality  in the 1980s  reduced  average 
incomes in the first  two quintiles  of the family income distribution  by 4 
percent,  while it increased  average  incomes in the top quintile  by 3 per- 
cent. These changes accounted for some, but not all, of the observed 
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The final section of the paper considered the effects of unemploy- 
ment, median  wages, and wage dispersion  on poverty rates. We found 
that regional poverty rates were highly correlated  with median wage 
growth and changes in the dispersion  of hourly wage rates. In light of 
previous findings, which suggest that poverty rates at the end of the 
1980s  were inexplicably  high, we analyzed the effects of labor market 
changes over the 1980s on poverty. We also estimated the effect of 
changing  family  composition  on measured  poverty rates. 
Negligible  real wage growth,  coupled  with growing  wage dispersion, 
implies  that  poverty  rates should  have increased  over the 1980s.  Trends 
in family composition  reinforced  this trend. In fact, the increase in the 
overall  poverty rate  from 1979  to 1989  (the end of the 1980s  expansion) 
was slightly  less than predicted.  This result is driven  by continued  im- 
provements  in the living standards  of the elderly, whose poverty rates 
have fallen  far  more  than  labor  market  indicators  would  have predicted. 
Among families with children, on the other hand, poverty grew faster 
during  the 1980s  than can be explained  by changes in the level and dis- 
persion  of wages and  changes  in unemployment. 
Our  overall  conclusion  is that  family  income and poverty are closely 
related  to conditions  in the labor  market.  The failure  of poverty rates to 
respond  to robust  GDP growth  during  the 1980s  is due to the combina- 
tion of slow productivity  growth  and widening  wage inequality  that ac- 
companied  the expansion  of the 1980s. Comments 
and Discussion 
Frank Levy: In this interesting and thoughtful paper, Rebecca M. 
Blank  and  David Card  address  the "new  view" that  poverty  and income 
inequality  no longer  respond  to macroeconomic  expansion.  The authors 
extend  traditional  "trickle-down"  studies  in two major  ways. First, they 
disaggregate  CPS data into nine census regions, which increases their 
observations  by an order  of magnitude. 
Second, they describe an economy using three variables:  two tradi- 
tional measures-median  household income and the unemployment 
rate-and  a measure  of wage dispersion.  If earlier  trickle-down  studies 
had included  a dispersion  measure, it probably  would have been insig- 
nificant;  wage dispersion  was generally  too stable. But in the 1980s,  the 
long expansion,  combined  with rapidly  widening  wage inequality,  gives 
a dispersion  measure  a definite  statistical  role. 
With  these extensions, the authors  conclude  that  the old view still  has 
some life. Together, the macroeconomic  variables (including  disper- 
sion) can still  do a good  job of predicting  the poverty  rate  and  changes  in 
quintile  shares. But there are some surprises. When the data are con- 
trolled for regional  effects, lower unemployment  does little to reduce 
household income inequality  (contrary  to studies done on national  ag- 
gregates). Similarly, without regional effects,  lower unemployment 
does little to reduce  poverty. 
I found  the paper  interesting.  I believe it could  be further  improved  by 
sharpening  one or two issues and looking  at a third:  the role of poverty 
concentration. 
The first  issue that  needs to be sharpened  is the meaning  of economic 
growth.  Blank  and  Card's  need to add  a dispersion  term  to the traditional 
model  indicates  that  the most recent "rising  tide"  was different  from  the 
expansions of the 1950s  and 1960s. This difference can be illustrated 
through  a little history. 
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In 1982, while writing  Losing Ground,  Charles  Murray  advanced a 
standard  trickle-down  theory  of poverty  reduction.  ' Writing  in the Pub- 
lic Interest, he noted that when real income per household had grown 
rapidly  in the 1950s  and 1960s, the poverty rate had fallen. When real 
income per household stagnated  after 1973,  the poverty rate stagnated 
too. What  I will call Old Murray  concluded  that the growth of real in- 
comes-not  the growth  of transfers  or the War  on Poverty-had caused 
poverty  to decline in the 1960s.  This is what  I would  call a neo-Tobinian 
view of poverty reduction,  and most members  of the Brookings  Panel, 
including  me, would  agree. 
By the time  Murray  finished  Losing Ground,  he had  come to measure 
economic  growth  in a different  way, using  real  income  per capita,  rather 
than  income per household.  This led to a more  provocative  conclusion: 
that  economic  growth  was as strong  in the 1970s  and  early 1980s  as it had 
been in the 1950s,  and yet the poverty rate was stagnant.  This was one 
of the first  statements  of the new view: that  a rising  tide no longer  lifted 
all boats. According  to the New Murray,  the problem  lay in an overly 
generous  welfare state, which induced  many  poor families  to leave the 
labor  market.2 
As I noted, I am  a believer  in Old  Murray.  In practice,  the importance 
of reducing  poverty through  rising  real wages even exceeds the impor- 
tance of the unemployment  rate. To illustrate,  two recessions occurred 
in the 1950s,  including  a quite  severe one that  ended  the decade. Yet real 
wages and median  income rose sharply,  and retrospective  applications 
of the poverty standard  show the poverty  rate  falling  from  about  31 per- 
cent in 1949  to 22 percent  in 1959. 
If one accepts this view-that  real wage growth  (adjusted  for disper- 
sion) has the biggest influence  on poverty rates3-then the 1980s  were 
1. Murray  (1982). 
2. As is well known,  income  per  capita  continued  to rise  after  1973  not because  wages 
grew, but because the composition  of the population  shifted  toward  workers  and away 
from dependents.  This trend, however, was more important  for husband-wife  families 
(who shifted  to two earners)  and young  adults  (who postponed  having  children)  than  for 
the rapidly  growing  number  of families  headed  by single  women. 
3. The  issue of dispersion  also  arises  in Blank  (1993).  Blank  finds  that  a standard  macro- 
economic  equation  substantially  overestimates  the poverty  reduction  that  occurred  in the 
1980s.  At least  part  of this  overestimate  seems  to occur  because  Blank's  measure  of real  in- 
come is based  on mean,  rather  than  median,  household  income.  During  the 1980s,  income 
growth  was  heavily  concentrated  in  the  distribution's  upper  tail,  so changes  in mean  house- 
hold  income  would  have  a much  smaller  impact  on poverty  than  in  earlier  years. 328  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
not much to write home about. The table below compares  it with two 
earlier  periods.  In the first  two data  columns, I decompose  GNP growth 
into  two components:  the annual  growth  of hours  worked  and  the annual 
growth  in output  per hour. It is, of course, the second term  that is most 
interesting.  The third data column adjusts output per hour for what 
Barry  Bosworth  has called  the "terms  of trade"  between sectors:  the dif- 
ference between the increase  in the GNP deflator  (which  adjusts  output 
per  hour)  and  the CPI  or a consumption  deflator  (which  is used in official 
poverty statistics).4 
Percent per year 
Output per hour 
Hours  Output  adjusted for 
Period  worked  per hour  terms of trade 
1959-73  1.01  2.81  3.22 
1973-79  1.79  0.74  0.74 
1979-89  1.45  0.99  0.98 
In sum, while there was not much poverty reduction  in the 1980s, 
there was not much economic growth, either-at  least of the kind that 
counted. It would be useful to make this point clearly to underline  the 
fact that  part  of the new view was based  on a faulty  measure  of the econ- 
omy's performance.  At the same time, the economy's performance  in 
the 1980s raises the possibility that factors beneath the surface were 
changing  in ways that will undermine  the ability of future economic 
growth  to reduce  poverty. The New Murray  may be right  in the future, 
even if he was not right  in the past. I will return  to this point  in a moment. 
A second issue that  needs sharpening  is the story  told by the regional 
dummies. As the authors  mention in passing, some regions are surro- 
gates for specific industries:  for example, the southwest for energy. 
More  generally,  the recoveries of the 1970s  and 1980s  were very differ- 
ent in their  regional  patterns.  Demographers  describe  much  of the 1970s 
as a "rural  renaissance."  In a sharp  reversal  of form,  both  nonmetropoli- 
tan areas and small metropolitan  areas (those with fewer than one mil- 
lion people in 1970)  grew  faster  than  large  metropolitan  areas. 
The reasons are not hard  to ascertain.  The food shortage  of the early 
1970s stimulated  the agricultural  economy, the 1973  oil price increase 
4. Ideally,  further  correction  should  be made  for the proportion  of compensation  that 
is paid  in health  insurance  and  other  kinds  of income  not counted  in standard  poverty  cal- 
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stimulated  energy  production,  and the rapidly  falling  value of the dollar 
helped  support  durable  goods manufacturing.  The boom  in  the heartland 
meant  a boom  in the demand  for blue  collar  labor,  which  helped  limit  the 
growth  of wage dispersion  during  the decade. 
The 1980s,  the decade of the bicoastal  economy, precisely reversed 
this story, while the early 1990s, the years of the bicoastal recession, 
may be reversing  things  again. In any case, a more detailed  interpreta- 
tion of regional  effects would provide an added bonus (beyond simply 
more  degrees  of freedom)  for the authors'  organization  of data. 
A smaller  point involves Blank  and Card's  treatment  of demograph- 
ics. At various  points, the authors  try  to examine  the impact  of changing 
household  structure  on both income  inequality  and  poverty. In these in- 
vestigations,  they look at changes in heads of households, but they do 
not separately  examine the shift from one- to two-earner  couples. The 
shift is important,  particularly  in the last decade, when it appears  that 
most of the increase in women's labor supply took place among the 
wives of husbands  with high  earnings.  This is a change  from  earlier  dec- 
ades; recent  work  by Paul  Ryscavage  and  his colleagues  suggests  it may 
have contributed  to income inequality.' 
Finally,  let me turn  to the issue that  is not in the paper:  the concentra- 
tion of poverty in cities. At the paper's beginning,  the authors  outline 
two competing  hypotheses to explain  why economic growth  has appar- 
ently failed to reduce  poverty. One theory is the declining  labor supply 
of the poor, but  this is really  an umbrella  for many  different  theories,  one 
of which  is the growth  of an underclass.  In the mid-1980s,  the underclass 
was given a geographic  content through  the work of William  J. Wilson, 
among others.6  It is clear that over the period studied by the authors, 
poverty  has increasingly  become a problem  of the central  cities. 
In 1970, central-city  poor accounted for only about one-third  of all 
poor in the nation  and the central-city  poverty rate was 0.14. In 1990, 
central  cities accounted for 42 percent of all poor and the central-city 
poverty  rate was 0.20. The shift was particularly  dramatic  for children. 
Central  cities now contain 45 percent of all poor children,  and almost 
one in three  central-city  children  is poor. 
Being  poor  is not the same  as being  part  of the underclass.  But as mid- 
dle-class blacks and whites continue to leave cities, one must wonder 
5.  U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1992c). 
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about  the culture  being left behind. Consider  as an indicator  the recent 
increase in murder  rates. Between the mid-1970s  and the mid-1980s, 
murder  rates for all demographic  groups were quite stable. Between 
1985  and 1991, murder  rates for older teenagers rose substantially.  In 
particular,  the number  of murders  of black  young  men  and  women, aged 
15-19, rose from  657 in 1985  to 1,600  in 1991.  If we assume that 80 per- 
cent of these murder  victims were males, a constant  murder  rate at the 
1991 level suggests that a black male fifteen year old has a 1-in-200 
chance of being murdered  before he turns 20. This number  suggests 
something  seriously wrong  that the standard  economic indicators  can- 
not capture.  Looking  more  carefully  at the effect of cities, as well as re- 
gions, may give more  clues as to what is happening  here. 
James L. Medoff: Rebecca M. Blank  and David Card's study of U.S. 
poverty rates over the past twenty-five  years is an example of creative 
and instructive  empiricism.  The statistical  analysis is unique  in relying 
on regressions  of regional,  as opposed to national,  data  on poverty, un- 
employment,  and  per capita  income. In addition,  by focusing  on income 
quintiles,  the study  provides  many  insights  lost in more  aggregate  inves- 
tigations. 
Two of the study's findings  most affect my thinking  about national 
poverty statistics. First, changes  in regional  poverty rates  depend  more 
on changes in regional  median  income than on regional  rates of unem- 
ployment. This is shown in table 7. Second, from 1967-79, the bottom 
two income quintiles suffered the greatest deterioration  in earnings. 
This is described  in table  5. 
My comments  are limited  to national  data, but my statistics  are quite 
consistent with the authors'  conclusions. The main difference  is that I 
focus on the downward  trend in the availability  of jobs for those who 
need them  to avoid poverty. 
In April 1992, I wrote a paper  called "The  New Unemployment"  in 
which  I noted  that  one of the main  characteristics  of the post-  1980  unem- 
ployment is that if workers lost their  jobs, their loss was much more 
likely to be permanent  than temporary.'  As is well documented  else- 
where,  job losers not "on  layoff' are unlikely  to return  to their  old  jobs. 
1. Medoff(1992).  The significance  of the relative  rise  in permanent  job loss in  the latest 
recession was also emphasized  by George  Perry  and Charles  Schultze  in their paper  in 
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I refer to them here as "permanent  job losers." People who are laid off 
can with very good reason  expect to be recalled  to their  old firm.  While 
76 percent  of all  job losers were permanent  job losers in February  1992 
(when payroll  employment  reached  its downturn  trough),  that percent- 
age was significantly  lower (66 percent) in the November 1982  trough 
and  even lower (59  percent)  in the trough  of March  1975. 
Another  salient  fact about  the new unemployment  is that  white collar 
workers  face a higher  risk  ofjoining the ranks  of the newly unemployed 
during  a cyclical downturn.  To be more precise, while the ratio of the 
number  of newly unemployed  white collar workers to the number  of 
newly unemployed  blue collar  workers  was only about  0.20 in the Janu- 
ary-July downturn  in 1980,  it rose markedly  to 0.40 between July 1981 
and  November 1982,  and  even more  sharply  to 0.93 in the recession  from 
July 1990  to February  1992. 
Katharine  Bradbury  of the Federal  Reserve Bank  of Boston was one 
of the first to note that many of these newly unemployed  white collar 
workers  came  from  occupations  and  industries  in which  median  pay was 
relatively low.2 Among all occupations, the group that suffered the 
largest  absolute  growth  of unemployment  was managers  and  profession- 
als (from  0.795 million  to 1.007  million).  This group, of course, is very 
well paid on average  and thus attracted  a great  deal of media  attention. 
Much  less discussed  was the fact that  the only other  occupational  group 
that suffered  increased  unemployment  between 1983  and 1992  was the 
on-average  poorly  paid  technical, sales, and  administrative  category  (in 
which unemployment  grew  from  2.116 million  to 2.268 million). 
"The New Unemployment"  presented  evidence-summarized here 
in table DI-that  strongly  implies  that the amount  of hiring  activity  per 
unemployed  worker  plummeted  in the years after 1980. 
This plummeting  NHW1/UR ratio motivated James Tobin to look 
closely at changes  in employment  in a presentation  he made  to the Joint 
Economic Committee  on February  1, 1993.  He noted that while in the 
twenty months after the November 1982  trough  employment  grew by 
about  6.5 million,  it grew by only about  0.5 million  in the twenty months 
after  the trough  of March  1992. 
Harvard  economics graduate  student  Andrew  Harless  portrayed  this 
country's anemic post-1980  job generation  somewhat  differently.3  Us- 
2.  Bradbury (1993). 
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Table Dl.  The Post-1980 Shortage of Jobs for the Unemployed 
Civilian  Normalized 
unemployment  help-wanted 
Year  rate (UR)  index (NHWI)a  NHWI!UR 
1980  7.1  100.2  14.1 
1984  7.5  97.3  13.0 
1991  6.7  60.7  9.1 
1992  7.4  59.4  8.0 
Source:  The  civilian  unemployment  rate  (UR),  measured  in  percent,  and  an  index  of  nonagricultural  paid 
employment  (El)  are  from  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics.  The  help  wanted  index  (HWI)  was  produced  by  the 
Conference  Board. 
a.  The normalized help wanted index (NHWI) is defined as HWI/El.  The NHWI was constructed  so that it equaled 
100 in 1985. 
ing the empirical  relationships  between the normalized  help wanted  in- 
dex, the unemployment  rate, and  inflation,  he estimated  that  the current 
rate of unemployment  associated with nonaccelerating  inflation  is well 
below 5. The corresponding  employment  gap for the most recent reces- 
sion has been exceeded only once (1982-83)  in the past thirty  years. 
In "The  New Unemployment,"  I used four  CPS microdata  sets (May 
of 1979, 1983,  and 1988,  and January  1991)  that indicated  how long em- 
ployees had worked for their current  firms. I defined employees with 
less than one year of company  service as new hires. I then constructed 
an index of the median  real  usual  weekly earnings  of these short-service 
workers.  This index  fell from 100  in May 1979  to 89 in January  1991.  Al- 
though  the unemployment  rate  fell from 10.1  percent  in May 1983  to 5.6 
percent in May 1988,  this index of median  earnings  of new workers  re- 
mained at 91. Among all workers, the analogous  index equaled 100 in 
1979,  94 in 1983,  96 in 1983,  and 95 in 1991.  Thus, while these were bad 
times for most wage and salary earners, they were especially bad for 
those new to ajob. 
Many  of those unemployed  after 1980  were unable  to secure any  job 
at all. Since nearly  all of the income  of most adults  comes from  the labor 
market, I believe that changes in hiring  must be critical in explaining 
changes in the rate of poverty. Before 1980,  when changes in hiring  in- 
tensity seesawed smoothly with changes in the unemployment  rate, it 
did not much  matter  which  variable  one chose for an econometric  inves- 
tigation. However, after 1980,  changes in these two measures  of labor 
market  conditions  stopped  moving  in sync. Thus, it was now possible to 
assess whether changes in the unemployment  rate without accompa- 
nying  changes  in hiring  activity  were associated  with changes  in the rate 
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Table  D2. Explaining  the Percent  of Persons  in Poverty  with Jobs Variablesa 
Parameter  estimates 
Regression  Regression  Regression 
Independent  variable  1  2  3 
Change  in the  0.471  0.046  0.124 
unemployment  rate  (0.094)  (0.154)  (0.180) 
Change  in the normalized  -0.034  - 0.033 
help wanted  indexb  . . .  (0.011)  (0.012) 
1980  Dummy  variable  0.545 
(1980  or later =  1)  ...  ...  (0.578) 
Change  in unemployment  0.034 
rate x  1980  Dummy  ...  ...  (0.517) 
Change  in normalized 
Help Wanted  Index x  0.020 
1980  Dummy  ...  ...  (0.042) 
R  2  0.525  0.679  0.712 
Source:  Author's  regressions  based on data from the Conference  Board and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the change  in the percent of persons  in poverty.  All regressions,  based  on twenty- 
five annual observations  from  1967-91,  include a constant  term and were corrected  for first-order serial correlation. 
The  mean of the dependent  variable is  -0.02,  and its  standard deviation  is 0.69.  The  numbers in parentheses  are 
standard errors. 
b.  Ratio equals the Conference  Board's help wanted index divided by an index of nonagricultural paid employment 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics  (ratio  =  100 in 1985). 
Intuitively,  it seemed quite  obvious that  deterioration  in this activity 
would increase poverty even if the unemployment  rate remained  un- 
changed.  Table  D2 presents  three  regressions  that  provide  evidence that 
this intuition  is quite  correct.  The regressions  reveal  that  throughout  the 
past twenty-five years, the change in hiring activity (as assessed by 
change  in the normalized  help  wanted  index)  was the labor  market  char- 
acteristic  most associated  with change  in the rate  of poverty. While  the 
association was somewhat weaker in the years after 1980  than it was 
from 1967-79, this weakening  does not explain the dramatic  post-1980 
growth  in the poverty  rate. What  does is the fact that  after 1980,  less un- 
employment  no longer  meant  more hiring  to the extent that it had prior 
to the 1980s. 
Olivier  Blanchard  has observed  that  to demonstrate  fully  that  a short- 
age of hiring  activity  caused the rise in the rate  of poverty, I had  to dem- 
onstrate  that those in the greatest need of jobs were unable to secure 
them. 
The first  fact that  should  be noted  is that  between  December  1979  and 
December  1992,  the percent  of the unemployed  who werejobless for fif- 
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December percentages, the "fifteen weeks or more" percentage ex- 
ceeded 38.6 only once in the month  after  the trough  of the deepest post- 
war  recession (in December 1982),  when it equaled  38.8. 
The fact that those with low predicted  earnings  found it particularly 
hard  to land ajob is supported  in May Current  Population  Survey data 
for 1975, 1984,  and 1992.  These surveys indicate  that among  the unem- 
ployed in the third  predicted  earnings  decile from the bottom, the per- 
centage  unemployed  for fifteen  weeks or more rose from  25.6 to 27.1 to 
30.3.4  Among  the unemployed  whose predicted  earnings  placed  them in 
the fourth decile from the bottom, the comparable  percentages were 
33.7, 35.4, and 37.5. In 1992  dollars, those in the third  decile from the 
bottom  had  predicted  usual  weekly earnings  of $317;  in the fourth  decile 
from  the bottom, median  predicted  earnings  were $401. While  individu- 
als earning  from  $16,000  to $21,000  a year  are not among  the very worst- 
off American  workers, they will rarely  have resources to sustain them 
for fifteen  or more  weeks without  any earnings. 
In light  of these figures  relating  predicted  earnings  to spells ofjobless- 
ness, I examined  the plight  of the unemployed  in the lowest paid white 
collar occupations:  technical, sales, and administrative,  from 1983-92; 
and clerical  plus sales, from 1971  to 1983.  The technical, sales, and ad- 
ministrative  group  was one of only two broad  occupational  categories 
with greater  unemployment  in 1992  than in 1983.  The only other cate- 
gory in which unemployment  rose was managers  and  professionals. 
The data  in table  D3 indicate  the percentage  of the unemployed  from 
the low-earnings  (clerical  plus sales) and technical, sales, and adminis- 
trative  occupational  groupings  who were unemployed  for at least fifteen 
weeks at various  points  from 1971  to 1992. 
These figures  demonstrate  forcefully  that, since 1980,  the lowest paid 
group of unemployed white collar workers has found it harder and 
harder  to earn  a living  that  would  enable  them  to avoid poverty. As was 
seen above, they certainly  were not the only vulnerable  workers who 
suffered  long spells ofjoblessness. 
It should be noted that 1982  long-term  unemployment  percentages 
were calculated  under  each of BLS's two most recent  occupational  clas- 
4. These  predicted  usual  weekly  earnings  figures  were  based  on regressions  of ln(usual 
weekly earnings)  with 1992  Current  Population  Survey  data  that  controlled  for age, race, 
sex, education, state of residence, and standard  metropolitan  statistical  area (SMSA) 
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Table D3.  Long Unemployment among Low-Paid White Collar Workers 
Percent of unemployed  in groups 
unemployed  for 15 or more weeks 
Civilian  Technical, 
unemployment  Sales, and 
Year  rate (percent)  Clerical  Sales  Administrative 
1971  5.9  23.1  22.0  n.a. 
1977  7.1  28.0  28.3  n.a. 
1982  9.7  31.4  29.2  30.3 
1983  9.5  n.a.  n.a.  36.6 
1984  7.5  n.a.  n.a.  29.4 
1992  7.4  n.a.  n.a.  37.4 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
sification  schemes. The similarity  of the 1982  figures implies strongly 
that  the 1971  to 1992  data  can be treated  as one twenty-one-year  continu- 
ous time series. Under this assumption,  table D3 reveals that the per- 
centage of low-wage unemployed  white collar  workers  who searched  a 
very long time for employment  rose sharply  from about 22 percent in 
1971  to about 37 percent in 1992.  Clearly,  the ability of many low-paid 
unemployed  white collar workers to avoid poverty diminished  greatly 
during  this period. Moreover, if years with roughly  similar  unemploy- 
ment  rates  are  compared,  it seems that  this trend  is secular,  not cyclical. 
In sum, it appears  quite  clear  that  since 1980,  many  economically  vul- 
nerable  unemployed  individuals  have had  great  difficulty  in securing  em- 
ployment  and earnings.  It is not at all surprising  that this difficulty  has 
been reflected  in post-1980  U.S. poverty rates. 
General Discussion 
James  Tobin  suggested  that  this paper  should  be understood  as exam- 
ining  whether  the poverty-reducing  effects of economic  growth  have re- 
mained  constant,  once important  factors  such as unemployment,  family 
composition,  and  wage dispersion  have been controlled  for. Tobin  went 
on to note  that-even  if the macroeconomic  success of the early  postwar 
period returned-poverty rates would not decline as fast now as be- 
tween  the 1930s  and 1960s  for two reasons. First, the migration  from  the 
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lier period, has stopped. Second, there are inevitable diminishing  re- 
turns to growth in reducing  poverty because of the narrowing  in the 
lower tail of the income distribution.  The farther  out in the lower tail a 
poverty  line falls, the smaller  will be the area  that  moves above the pov- 
erty line for any given rightward  shift of mean  income. 
Some panel members suggested that Rebecca Blank and David 
Card's  paper  would have benefited  from  more explicit treatment  of ma- 
jor factors  affecting  income. Henry  Aaron  argued  that  to understand  the 
link between economic growth and poverty one needs to analyze the 
specific  mechanisms  by which growth  might  affect poverty:  labor  force 
participation,  hours  employed,  wage rates, and  transfer  payments.  Gary 
Burtless  focused on the role  of government  transfer  payments  . Although 
increases in the real wage are important  for many  families, they do not 
help families whose income comes from other sources. He noted that 
an earlier  work by Blank showed that the different  rates of increase in 
government  transfers  in the 1960s  and 1980s  explained  an important  part 
of the differences  in the poverty  reduction  in those two decades. 
Robert  Gordon  focused on the role of real wage growth  and factors 
that  might  affect  it. He suggested  that  the first-order  explanation  for why 
the poverty rate stopped  declining  was that  real  earnings  stopped  grow- 
ing. The direct  explanation  for the stagnation  of real  earnings  is the slug- 
gishness in productivity  growth.  But he cautioned  that  causality  can run 
in the reverse direction:  an ample supply of low-wage workers  can re- 
duce the necessity for businesses to increase  their  productivity.  And in 
this case, immigration  could affect the supply  of low-wage  workers  and 
real earnings.  In addition,  Gordon  reported  results by George  Johnson 
and Frank Stafford  suggesting  that an increased supply of goods from 
abroad  reduces  the rents  earned  by high  school graduates.  Card  strongly 
disagreed with Gordon's suggestion on immigration,  reporting  that it 
was rejected by his own research on wages of low-wage workers in 
Miami  in the five years after  the Mariel  Boatlift. 
Chris Sims turned to issues related to the regional disaggregation 
used in the paper.  He suggested  that  the authors'  results  might  change  if 
they accounted  for migration.  For example, it could be that unemploy- 
ment does not affect the income distribution  of a region  because unem- 
ployed people  move out. William  Nordhaus  noted  that  an earlier  Brook- 
ings  paper by  Olivier Blanchard and Larry Katz  suggested that 
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argued  that migration  across regions  is a relatively  small  phenomenon, 
especially as a short-term  response. Blank added that interregional 
movement  of low-income  households  is especially rare. Nordhaus  also 
pointed  out that  regional  and national  cycles can have very different  ef- 
fects on the income  distribution  within  a region.  A person  whose income 
derives  from  a portfolio  of the S&P 500 likely would fare better in a re- 
gional  downturn  than  a very immobile  worker  whose income  derives  en- 
tirely  from  labor. On the other hand,  a national  slowdown  might  have a 
larger  effect on the income of the S&P  500-holder. 
Paul  Romer  acknowledged  the authors'  evidence that  changes  in fam- 
ily composition have not affected the responsiveness  of poverty to 
growth, but asked how important  family composition was for under- 
standing  poverty  levels during  the 1980s.  Card  indicated  that  changes  in 
family composition  did matter  in the 1980s, but that the splintering  of 
families is a long-term  trend that began well before the 1980s;  in fact, 
there  were bigger  changes  between 1969  and 1979  than  during  the 1980s. 
Robert  Hall brought  up the role of relative  prices in gauging  poverty. If 
poverty were defined  as the inability  to purchase  a basket of goods,  it 
would  have declined  substantially  in the 1980s,  reflecting  a decline  in the 
relative price goods. The problem is that the relative prices of other 
items  in the consumption  bundle,  such as housing  and  utilities,  rose rap- 
idly. Hall  questioned  whether  the CPI  is sufficiently  accurate  on housing 
prices to be trusted.  Frank  Levy replied  that  the PCE deflator  for hous- 
ing-which  does not suffer  from  the same problems  as the CPI-yields 
the same story  for real  wages. 
Part  of the discussion  centered  on the usefulness  of the Help Wanted 
Index  in explaining  poverty  and  employment  trends.  James  Medoff  sug- 
gested that  the Index is related  to poverty  because changes  in the Index 
capture  shifts  in the Beveridge  curve and  thus changes  in the vulnerabil- 
ity of the unemployed.  Robert  Hall added  that  6 percent  unemployment 
is today associated with worse problems  than it was twenty years ago, 
because more  unemployment  is permanent  today. 338  Brookings Paper-s on  Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
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